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Summary 
As of today, there are no binding obligations under international human rights 
law for companies. Therefore, the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines has 
emerged as soft law instruments which explains social and legal expectations 
on states and business in regards of human rights. According to the principles, 
states has the primary role in protecting human rights while business should 
respect human rights throughout their operations. By following these 
principles, states and business can prevent and mitigate human rights abuses 
by reducing domestic legal barriers.  
 
In the past decades the international community have been concerned with 
the issue of multinational enterprises potential and actual adverse impacts on 
human rights throughout their transnational operations. Through affiliates, 
suppliers or contractors, business operations may occur in low cost 
manufacturing states where corruption is high, and rule of law is weak. 
Therefore, the host states may fail to provide right-holders with access 
remedy. In effect, this system sometimes benefits parent or buying companies 
at the expense of right-holders.  
 
When human rights abuses have occurred within the operations of 
multinational enterprises, domestic courts have tried claims against parent 
companies in private and criminal law. However, the attempts have been less 
successful due to extraterritorial limitations in criminal law, limited liability 
of separate legal entities and difficulties with proving causality in tort law. 
The concept of unjust enrichment as a ground for restitution may provide the 
right-holders with an effective grievance that could fill the void uncovered in 
contract, tort and criminal law. This concept may thereby help strengthening 
legal frameworks for holding MNEs accountable and help victims of human 
rights abuses to obtain remediation from a parent company.  
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Sammanfattning 
I dagsläget har inte företag några bindande förpliktelser för mänskliga 
rättigheter i internationell rätt. Istället har FN:s vägledande principer för 
företag och mänskliga rättigheter samt OECD:s riktlinjer för multinationella 
företag utvecklats. Enligt dessa principerna har staterna det primära ansvaret 
att skydda mänskliga rättigheter och företag har ett ansvar att respektera 
mänskliga rättigheter i hela deras verksamhet. Genom att följa dessa 
principerna kan stater och företag förebygga och lindra kränkningar av 
mänskliga rättigheter.  
 
De senaste årtiondena har det internationella samfundet bekymrat sig över 
multinationella företags potentiella och faktiska negativa påverkan på 
mänskliga rättigheter genom sina transnationella verksamheter. I vissa fall 
förekommer det att multinationella företag är verksamma i stater där 
tillverkningskostnaden är låg, korruptionen hög och rättsstaten svag. Det 
innebär att värdstaten i vissa fall inte kan förse rättighetsbärarna med en saklig 
prövning och inte heller nå gottgörelse från det företag som har kränkt de 
mänskliga rättigheterna. I detta system förekommer det att moderbolag tjänar 
på rättighetsbärarnas bekostnad.  
 
När mänskliga rättigheter har kränkts i ett multinationellt företags 
transnationella verksamhet, har inhemska domstolar fått till uppgift att ställa 
företagen till svars enligt civilrättsliga eller straffrättsliga principer. Dessvärre 
har rättighetsbärare haft svårt att få sin sak prövad på grund av begränsningar 
i straffrättslig jurisdiktion, principen om juridiska personers begränsade 
ansvar samt svårigheterna att bevisa skadeståndsrättsliga orsakssamband. 
Därför har det varit av vikt att undersöka andra grunder för talan utöver 
avtalsrätt, skadeståndsrätt och straffrätt. Principen om otillbörlig vinst kan 
erbjuda rättighetsbärarna en anledning att söka gottgörelse från moderbolag 
och därmed stärka den rättsliga ramen inom vilken multinationella företag 
kan hållas ansvariga för mänskliga rättighetskränkningar.  
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Abbreviations  
Bill of Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
ILO Declaration International Labour Organization’s Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
ILO MNE Declaration International Labour Organization’s Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
MNC Multinational Corporations  
MNE  Multinational Enterprises  
OECD  The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development  
OECD Guidelines  The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises  
SRSG  Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General  
UNCHR  UN Commission on Human Rights 
UNGPs   UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Enriching Multinational Enterprises  
The multinational enterprise (MNE) is an institution in both domestic and 
global affairs. With the increasing possibilities of investing in foreign 
companies and establishing affiliates across the world, the MNE is benefitting 
from the open global market.1 Companies can be part of MNEs in where the 
legal entities are kept separate from each other’s responsibilities but operate 
as one economic entity with the purpose of gaining profits. Since the gas leak 
in Bhopal, India in 1984, attention has been drawn to the issue of corporate 
accountability due to the involvement of MNEs in adverse impact on human 
rights through their operations.2 
 
Even though the recognition of fundamental human rights across the globe 
have advanced since the Universal Declarations of Human Rights3 (Bill of 
Rights), victims of human rights abuse still struggle with gaining access to 
remedies from corporations when abuses occur within MNEs operations. This 
upholds a system which benefits MNEs, especially the parent company, and 
sometimes at the expense of the human right-holders.  
 
                                               
1 Not only are the MNEs benefitting from international trade and investment, also home and 
host states are benefitting through the supply of products and services and employment 
opportunities, see The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing (2011), p. 14, available 
at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264115415-en.pdf?expires=1526213960& 
id=id&accname=guest&checksum=05A65322297009C5835B8678B80AD214.  [Accessed 
2018-05-13]. 
2 In Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984, 
D.C. S.D. New York Opinion, 12 May 1986 (The United States).  
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘Bill of Rights’, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III); 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, ‘ILO Declaration’ (adopted 18 June 1988); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, ‘ICCPR’ (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
‘ICESCR’, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), 993 UNTS 3.  
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How to address this issue has been discussed over the past decades. The first 
suggestion was to ensure that transnational corporations had similar 
responsibilities to protect human rights under international law as states.4 This 
suggestion was abandoned by the international community and replaced with 
soft law instruments called the UN Guiding Principles5 (UNGPs) and the 
OECD Guidelines.6 The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines do not create new 
binding obligations on states nor business, but they are relevant and necessary 
in the context to explain social and possible legal expectations society has on 
both states and business in protecting or respecting human rights.  
 
The state has the primary role in protecting right-holders from abuse under 
international human rights law, and businesses have an obligation to respect 
human rights throughout its operations.7 The states are required to provide 
laws and grievance mechanisms for right-holders to seek remedies from 
corporations when they have caused harm. Businesses are expected to comply 
with laws and regulations to prevent and mitigate any harms occurring within 
their operations. Many states provide judicial or non-judicial mechanism for 
human rights victims to access remedy, but in some states the legal system is 
ineffective, corrupt or legal barriers remain, thus in effect protecting 
companies from liability for human rights abuses. Therefore, academics have 
argued that there is a ‘legal gap’ and that a treaty on business and human 
rights could possibly bridge this legal gap.8 This solution has also been 
discussed by the Human Rights Council in 2017, but no legally binding 
instrument has been adopted at this point.9 
                                               
4 UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, Draft UN Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, ‘the Draft Norms’, UN Doc. E/1990/94. 
5 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ”Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, Human Rights Council, ‘UNGPs’, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, March 21, 2011. 
6 OECD Guidelines.  
7 Pillar 2 of the UNGPs and in general OECD Guidelines.  
8 In general, see Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (red)., Building a Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights: Context and Contours, Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
9 See Human Rights Council, Elements for The Draft Legally Binding Instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights 
Chairmanship of the OEIGWG established by HRC Res. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (29/09/2017).  
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Since a treaty has not been adopted, attempts to seek remediation from parent 
companies have utilized concepts of piercing the corporate veil, direct 
liability in tort law or criminal liabilities of companies.10 However, previous 
attempts have demonstrated the difficulties in holding the parent company 
responsible for acts or omissions by other legal entities. An alternative 
solution may be to shift the focus from contract, tort and criminal law to the 
law of restitution and the doctrine of unjust enrichment which could provide 
right-holders with the right to seek remedy from parent or buying companies.  
1.2 Purpose  
One of the great challenges in business & human rights is to establish legal 
accountability for multinational enterprises. Establishing legal accountability 
in international human rights law could help overcome legal barriers that 
protect parent companies of MNEs and makes it almost impossible for 
victims of human rights abuse to pursue redress. The purpose of this thesis is 
to explain the difficulties with attributing legal liability to parent companies 
under contract, tort and criminal law for actions of their subsidiaries, suppliers 
or contractors. By revisiting the principle of unjust enrichment and applying 
it to human rights law, my aim is to move beyond the previous attempts and 
explore restitution as a remedy.  
1.3 Research Questions  
For the purpose of this thesis, I will therefore answer three main questions:  
- What are the multinational enterprises responsibilities under 
international human rights law?  
- What are the rules of attribution in private law?  
                                               
10 See Human Rights Council, Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy of Business-
Related Human Rights abuse, Report of the OHCHR, 10 May 2016, A/HRC/32/19. 
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- Could the concept of unjust enrichment assist in strengthening legal 
frameworks for holding MNEs accountable and help victims of 
human rights abuses to obtain remediation from a parent company?  
1.4 Methodology and Material  
To answer the research questions, I have used a traditional legal method and 
a comparative method. The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines are not binding 
upon states nor business, but they serve as a benchmark of what to expect 
from states and business in respect of international human rights. Therefore, 
these instruments are used as a backdrop in explaining the on-going 
discussion on parent companies’ responsibility for adverse human rights 
impacts in their global operations. Official documents, reports and academic 
writings have been taken into consideration to show the various approaches 
to the issue.  
 
By comparing domestic law and practices from common and civil law 
jurisdictions, I elaborate and explain the latest developments on the subject 
of ‘corporate accountability’ in business and human rights. The purpose of 
the thesis is not to compare domestic laws and evaluate whether any domestic 
approach is preferable. A comparative perspective has been applied to 
achieve a greater understanding of the principles applied in private law and 
the themes that have shaped the approaches to remediation from parent 
companies for human rights abuses.  
 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a concept in the law of restitution and a 
concept that common law academics are more familiar with than in civil 
law.11 Therefore, the main material and sources on the doctrine are case law 
and academic writing from common law jurisdictions. The main sources 
covering details of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment can be traced 
                                               
11 Two academics that have contributed with their research on the concept are Andrew 
Burrows, Professor of the Law of England at the University of Oxford and the late Peter 
Birks, Regius Professor of Civil Law at the University of Oxford.  
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back to the mid 1900s. Applying unjust enrichment for the purpose of 
recovering enrichment to victims of corporate abuse, appeared in academic 
writings just before the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, and a few in the 
post-Principles period. It will take years for in-depth treatments of this subject 
to emerge in academics and official documents.  
1.5 Previous Research and Delimitations  
As the research in this project has advanced, the materials revealed that 
academics that have experimented with the doctrine of unjust enrichment has 
focused on the doctrine as a grievance in the context of international law, 
environmental law and human rights law.12 But in respect of human rights, 
the context has been limited to indigenous peoples’ rights. My aim with this 
thesis is to pick up where other academics have left of. Therefore, my research 
questions have not been narrowed down to any specific human right, thus 
applying the concept in a bigger context.  
 
I have limited my research on the doctrine of unjust enrichment to grasp the 
essential aspects that are common in different jurisdictions without getting 
bogged down in peculiarities of each jurisdiction. The essentials should be 
enough to stimulate our thinking on parent liability and grasp the potential of 
unjust enrichment as a new basis for remedies.  
                                               
12 See Aura Weinbaum, ‘Unjust Enrichment: An Alternative to Tort Law and Human Rights 
in the Climate Change Context’, 20 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J., (2011) pp. 429–454, available 
at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/pacrimlp20&i=433. [Accessed 2018-04-
09]; David N. Fagan, ‘Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of 
Indigenous Peoples against Multinational Corporations’, 76:2 N.Y.U.L Rev. (2001) p. 626–
664, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals 
/nylr76&i=644. [Accessed 2018-03-26]; Peter B. Oh, ‘Veil-Piercing Unbound’, 93 B. U. L. 
Rev. (2013) pp. 89–138, available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1925009. [Accessed 
2018-05-06]; and  Charles Manga Fombad, ‘The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in 
International Law’, 30 Comp. & Int’l L. J S. Afr (1997) pp. 120–130 available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ciminsfri30&i=127. [Accessed 2018-04-17]. 
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1.6 Structure 
The first chapter (Chapter 2) covers the core features of the UNGPs and the 
OECD Guidelines to inform the reader on the current status of the 
responsibilities of states, business and international organisations in 
international law. In Chapter 3 I analyse and explain the fundamental rules of 
private law and what attributes liability to a parent company. Beside the rules 
of attribution, this chapter also covers a section of accountability concepts of 
piercing the corporate veil and inferring direct liability for parent companies.  
 
Moving forward, in Chapter 4 I explain the core features of unjust enrichment 
and simultaneously applies the concept on cases touched upon in the previous 
chapters. The aim with this chapter is to exemplify previous cases and revisit 
unjust enrichment as a ground for restitution from parent companies. In the 
final chapter, Chapter 5, the reader will find my own thoughts and analysis of 
the findings that have been discussed throughout the thesis.  
 11 
2 The Guiding Principles  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a background of the 
current developments in business and human rights with a focus on the 
UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.13 By 
comparing and explaining these instruments, my aim is to provide the reader 
with a relevant background of corporate accountability and the access to 
remedy under international human rights law.  
During his mandate as a Special Representative, John G. Ruggie approached 
the business and human rights agenda with an idea of a policy-based soft law 
instrument. The previous work on the Draft UN Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations (Draft Norms) as an attempt to form a binding 
treaty on business and human rights was abandoned by the international 
community.14 The UNGPs is different from the Draft Norms because the 
purpose of the principles is not to create new obligations under international 
law, but clarifying the roles and duties of states, companies and international 
organizations in the business and human rights sphere.15 The UNGPs are not 
legally binding upon states nor business, but they mark a breakthrough in 
itself because “[…] it is first time the UN member states adopted a common 
position laying down standards of expected behaviour from business with 
regard to human rights.”16 The OECD Guidelines are, just as the UNGPs, 
non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a 
                                               
13 The OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ‘OECD Guidelines’.  
14 Compare the Draft Norms with the UN Guiding Principles. The Draft Norms recognized 
that transnational corporations and other business enterprises had responsibilities for 
promoting and securing the human rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.  
15 ’General Principles’ in The UN Guiding Principles, p. 1 and Introductory description of 
the Special Representative’s mandate and the UN ”Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, September 2010, ‘the Introductory 
description of SRSG’, available at: https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-
framework.pdf.  [Accessed 2018-01-31].  
16 Citing Radu Mares (red.), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
foundations and implementation, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011, p 1.  
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global context.17 These non-binding principles are multilaterally agreed, and 
a comprehensive code of responsible business conduct that governments of 
the OECD have committed to promoting.18  
This chapter will be divided into three sections, following the three pillars of 
the UNGPs; the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect, 
and access to remedy. In this chapter, I will explain what can be expected 
from states and corporations under international human rights law, without 
creating new obligations on states and corporations. 
2.1 State Duty to Protect Human Rights  
Under international human rights law, the states have obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights within their territory and/or jurisdiction.19 As 
described in the UNGPs, this includes the duty to protect against human rights 
abuses by third parties, including business enterprises.20 The OECD 
Guidelines are addressed not only to states, but also directly to MNEs.21 
Under international human rights law, the states have both positive and 
negative obligations. Not only do the states have a negative obligation to 
refrain from abusing human rights, but the states also have positive 
obligations as a primary role in preventing and addressing corporate-related 
human rights abuses.22 To fulfil its primary role, the state should consider 
policies, legislation and regulations to prevent negative human rights impacts 
caused by business enterprises.23  
 
In order to prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights abuses, the 
state is required to perform human rights due diligence. They should also 
                                               
17 OECD Guidelines, p. 3. 
18 OECD Guidelines, p. 3.  
19 Article 2 in ICCPR.  
20 See Commentary to Principle 1, UNPGs.  
21 OECD Guidelines, p. 3.  
22 See the Introductory Description of the SRSG.  
23 See Commentary to Principle 1, UNGPs.  
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encourage MNEs within their territory to observe the principles by enforcing 
laws and address legal gaps.24  
 
The state’s duty to protect human rights does not require regulating the 
extraterritorial activities of business domiciled within their jurisdiction, but 
neither are the state prohibited from doing so as long as there is a recognized 
jurisdictional basis.25 However, the state’s duty of promoting the OECD 
Guidelines does not stretch beyond the state’s territory.26 Extraterritorial 
protection of human rights is a debated subject and some are of the view that 
there is an increasing international recognition of the legal obligation on states 
to take action to prevent abuses by their corporations’ activities overseas.27 
An extraterritorial protection is perhaps a compelling approach that could 
address human rights risks in host states where the protection of human rights 
is weak, or where the victims of corporate abuse do not have sufficient access 
to remedy. However, the debate is related to broader concerns of international 
law because an extraterritorial protection may interfere with the sovereign 
rights that states claim over their territory and private actors therein.28  
 
                                               
24 Principle 3, 4, 5 and 6, UNGPs and OECD Guidelines, pp. 17–18.  
25 A recognized jurisdictional basis could be where abuses are committed by or against their 
nationals, see Commentary to Principle 2, UNGPs; and John G. Ruggie, Just Business: 
Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 2013, pp. 
84–85.  
26 OECD Guidelines pp. 3, 7–8, 67. 
27 See The OHCHR Report on Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy of Business-
Related Human Rights abuse, which did not advocate for a extraterritorial protection; 
However others have advocate for extraterritorial protection of human rights, in ETO 
Consortium, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Heidelberg, Germany, January 2013, available at: 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drbl 
ob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23. [Accessed 2018-05-10]; see Justine Nolan, ’Mapping the 
Movement: The Business and Human Rights Regulatory Framework’ in Dorothée Baumann-
Pauly (ed.), Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practice, Routledge, Abingdon, 
2016, p. 43.  
28 See Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, ‘Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: in which 
international human rights law finds new ways to tame global corporate power’, 19:6 Int.  J. 
H. R. p. 834, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2015.1006904. [Accessed 2018-
02-05]. 
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The state’s duty to protect under the first pillar of the UNGPs consists of both 
positive and negative obligations, where the former obliges the state to take 
active measures to prevent human rights violations to occur, and the latter 
obliges the state to refrain from violating human rights. It has been pointed 
out in the UNGPs, that the state has the primary role to protect, respect and 
fulfil human rights. This duty is important since that the laws and regulations 
of the parent company’s home state may not apply if the human rights 
violations have occurred in another state.29 
2.2 Corporate Responsibility to Respect  
As has been described in the previous section, the states have the primary 
obligation to protect human rights within their territory and/or jurisdiction.30 
Nevertheless, business enterprises should respect human rights.31 Wherever 
MNEs operate, they should avoid infringing the human rights of others, 
address adverse human rights impacts if they are involved in such and 
perform human rights due diligence.32 The corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business 
enterprises wherever they operate.33 The corporate responsibility to respect 
exists independently of the states’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their 
own human rights obligations and this responsibility exists over and above 
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting international human 
rights.34  
 
The UNGPs and the OECD Guidenlines does not create any new or binding 
obligations on states nor MNEs, but MNEs should respect internationally 
recognized human rights such as those expressed in the Bill of Rights and 
                                               
29 See Augenstein & Kinely, Beyond the 100 Acre Wood, pp. 836–837.  
30 OECD Guidelines, p. 22.  
31 According to Ruggie, the corporate responsibility to respect is widely held in societal 
expectations and in soft law instruments, see Radu Mares, ’A Gap in the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’, 36:3 Monash U. L. Rev., pp. 46–54, available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/monash36&i=633. [Accessed 2018-05-10].  
32 Principle 11, UNGPs and OECD Guidelines pp. 19–20 and 31–34.  
33 See Commentary to Principle 11, UNGPs and OECD Guidelines, p. 19.  
34 See Commentary to Principle 11, UNGPs.  
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ILO instruments.35 This list of human rights standards is not exhaustive and 
depending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to consider 
additional standards.36   
 
While the UNGPs calls for all enterprises and companies to respect human 
rights, the OECD Guidelines also address business responsibilities, especially 
parent entities’ responsibility in regards of ensuring strategic guidance of the 
enterprise, effective monitoring of management and to be accountable to the 
enterprise and shareholders as well as taking into account the interests of 
stakeholders.37 The OECD Guidelines emphesizes that the principles should 
extend to enterprise groups and that operations in other jurisdicitons does not 
prevent them from setting up compliance and control systems where possible 
to their subsidiaries.38 Furthermore, when an enterprise engage with suppliers 
and other entities in the supply chain they are encouraged to participate in 
industry-wide collabrotive efforts with other enterprises to coordinate supply 
chain policies.39  
 
Read together with the MNEs due diligence responsibility in the UNGPs, both 
instruments implies that MNEs themselves can detect risks or human rights 
abuses within their transnatioanl operations, thus preventing harms from 
occuring or make sure that the entity are held accountable.40  
2.3 Access to remedy  
The state duty to protect human rights also includes a duty to take appropriate 
steps to ensure that when human rights abuses occur within their territory 
                                               
35 See Commentary to Principle 11, UNGPs; OECD Guidelines, pp. 31–34, 37; and ILO, 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy, ‘ILO MNE Declaration’, (adopted in November 1977, last revised in March 2017).  
36 For example, enterprises should respect the standards of international humanitarian law in 
situations of an armed conflict, see Commentary to Principle 11, UNGPs.  
37 OECD Guidelines, p. 22.  
38 OECD Guidelines, p. 22.  
39 OECD Guidelines, p. 25.  
40 OECD Guidelines, pp. 22–23 and Principle 15 and 17, UNGPs. 
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and/or jurisdiction, those affected should have access to remedy.41 The 
appropriate steps can be through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
means as long as they investigate, punish and redress business-related human 
rights abuses when they occur. If the states do not carry out their duty to 
ensure effective remedy, their duty to protect human rights may be rendered 
weak or meaningless.42  
 
In the UNGPs, Ruggie used the terms of ‘grievance’ and ‘grievance 
mechanism’. Grievance should be understood in a broad sense, thus covering 
many types of reasons for remediation, which is important in order to provide 
access to effective remedy for victims. The mechanism, through which access 
remedy is provided, can be administrated by a state agency or branch, or by 
an independent body on a statutory or constitutional basis and they may be 
judicial or non-judicial. For states who are adhering to the OECD Guidelines, 
they can provide access to remedy through National Contact Points (NCPs)43 
 
The principles of access to remedy has both procedural and substantive 
aspects.44 Effective grievance mechanism also plays an important role for the 
corporate responsibility to respect. If a business enterprise identify adverse 
human rights impacts which could constitute a crime, it is important that a 
grievance mechanism is put in place for the business enterprise to cooperate 
with, and to make sure that business enterprises will be held accountable for 
adverse human rights impacts they may have caused or contributed to.45  
While the UNGPs itself does not provide the states with any implemention 
mechanism to report to or mediate through whenever abuses have occurred in 
operations of an MNE, the OECD Guidelines provide state with NCPs.46 This 
                                               
41 Principle 25, UNGPs.  
42 See Commentary to Principle 25, UNGPs.  
43 See Commentary to Principle 25, UNGPs; the purpose of the NCPs is to further the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines. They operate with core criterions of visibility, accessibility, 
transparency and accountability, OECD Guidelines, p. 71. 
44 Principle 25, UNGPs.  
45 See Commentary to Principle 22, UNGPs; and The Introductory description of the SRSG.  
46 OECD Guidelines, pp. 3 and 71.   
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is probably one of the greatest differences between the UNGPs and the OECD 
Guidelines, because this gives the states an incentative to co-operate with 
MNEs and address abuses that occur within their territory.47 
In many ways the claimants have expanded possibilities to bring cases against 
business enterprises in the courts of the home country or to NCPs, but the 
practice remains contested.48 Therefore, states should consider ways to reduce 
legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access 
to remedy.49 Practical and procedural barriers can be when the costs of 
bringing claims are too expensive and cannot be reduced to reasonable levels 
through government support, “market-based” mechanisms (litigation 
insurance and legal fee structures), or it is difficult for claimants to secure 
legal representation due to lack of resources.50 There also exists a legal barrier 
when legitimate cases involving business-related human rights abuses is 
prevented from being addressed due to domestic criminal and civil laws, 
which for example facilitates the avoidance of legal responsibility by 
members of a corporate group.51 
In contrast to the UNGPs, the OECD Guidelines is a package with an own 
implementation mechanism, but the OECD Guidelines is only 
recommendations directed against the adhering states, not the global 
community. Even if the OECD Guidelines may have more effect on states 
duty to protect human rights due to NCPs, legal barriers have to be reduced 
and effective grievance mechanism have to be put in place in all countries to 
overcome the issue of access to remedy from parent companies. Therefore, 
                                               
47 The implementation mechanisms of NCP are under the responsibility of the Investment 
Committee of OECD who should oversee the functioning of the Guidelines, OECD 
Guidelines, p. 77.  
48 See Ruggie, Just Business: pp. 102–103. The OECD Guidelines are recommendations for 
the adhering countries of the OECD which recommend that each adhering State should put 
in place a ‘NCP’ which would serve as an implementation mechanism of the OECD 
Guidelines and provide mediation and conciliation to resolve issues that may arise, OECD 
Guidelines, p. 3.  
49 Principle 26, UNGPs.  
50 For more examples see Commentary to Principle 26, UNGPs.  
51 See Commentary to Principle 26, UNGPs. 
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the legal barriers of holding the parent company responsible for adverse 
human rights impacts is a demanding issue that requires work.   
 19 
3 Corporate accountability  
The UNGPs and OECD Guidelines clarify what is expected regarding 
businesses operations under international human rights law. The principles 
apply to all states and enterprises, no matter the size or the corporate 
structure.52 This chapter is dedicated to the fundamental rules and principles 
in private law that governs the liability of a company within a corporate 
group. In the following sections I will examine the rules of attribution and the 
principles of separate legal entities and limited liability. The last two sections 
of this chapter are devoted to the doctrines of piercing of the corporate veil 
and direct liability which have challenged the basic rules of private law.  
3.1 Legal Entities and Limited Liability  
In private law, the corporation is a separate legal person with its own rights 
and obligations. The rights and obligations of the corporation is separate from 
its shareholders’. This principle is accepted internationally and has a long 
history in Anglo-American law.53 Within an MNE, a shareholder may be an 
individual or another legal entity.  
 
The principle of separate legal entities has derived from the construction of 
the ‘legal person’. This construction in law and economics have created a 
fictional person who have rights and duties under law, much similar to the 
                                               
52 See the General Principles, UNGPs; Ruggie, Just Business, p. 97–98; and OECD 
Guidelines, pp. 17–18.  
53 See Phillip I. Blumberg, ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’, 11:4 J. Corp. L., (1986), 
p. 577, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/jcorl11&i=583. [Accessed 
2018-02-19]; This is a rule in Swedish civil code, Chap. 1, 3§ Swedish Commercial 
Legislation (2005:551) (Aktiebolagslagen); See commentary of Sten Andersson, Svante 
Johansson and Rolf Skoglund, Swedish Commercial Legislation (12 June 2017, Zeteo, 
www.wolterskluwer.se/zeteo), available at: https://zeteo.nj.se/document/abl05komm 
_ablkkap01_s3_s1?anchor=xablkommq2005q551_1_kap_3_px. [Accessed 2018-03-06]; 
Swedish case law: NJA 1942 s 473, NJA 1947 s 647; NJA 2014 s 877 (Supreme Court 
Decisions); see Robert McCorquodale and Lise Smith, ‘Human Rights, Responsibilities and 
Due Diligence’ in Deva & Bilchitz, Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: 
Context and Contours, p. 229; and United Kingdom case law: Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd 
[1897] A.C 22 (H.L). 
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rights and duties of an individual. Thereby, a legal person has full legal 
capacity and can own shares in another company. By this construction, 
companies can merge into MNE’s where each member of the enterprise is 
separate from the other’s obligations.54 
 
The MNE structure can be either equity-based or contract-based. An equity-
based corporation makes a shareholder not liable for its subsidiary’s deeds 
even though it owns the subsidiary by shares. A contract-based structure is a 
genuine separation between companies because the only relationship between 
the parent company and another entity is the contract.55  
 
By these corporate structures, the MNE can reduce its economic risks which 
stimulates the economic activity of the enterprise.56 On a global market, the 
MNE can be divided into separate legal entities within several jurisdictions.57 
The separation of legal entities reduces the transactions costs, protects the 
investments of shareholders by limiting their liability, and the entity can serve 
as a shield from personal creditors of the owners.58 The MNE can benefit 
from this principle in several ways and protect shareholders, such as a parent 
company, from liability. Limited liability gives little incentive for parent 
companies to avoid high-risk projects that could infringe human rights 
because another legal entity would bear the real costs of such operations. 
                                               
54 See Filip Gregor, Principles and Pathways: Legal Opportunities to Improve Europe’s 
Corporate Accountability Framework, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, Brussels, 
2010, available at: http://corporatejustice.org/documents/publications/eccj/eccj_principles 
_pathways_webuseblack.pdf. [Accessed 2018-02-26]. 
55 See Radu Mares, ’Legalizing Human Rights Due Diligence and the Separation of Entities 
Principle’ in Deva & Bilchitz, Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context 
and Contours, p. 270 
56 See the critical analysis of the positive economic implications of limited liability of 
corporations in Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, pp. 611–616.  
57 See Mares, Legalizing Human Rights Due Diligence and the Separation of Entities 
Principle, p. 266–267.   
58 See Andrew Verstein, ‘Enterprise without Entities’, 116:2 Mich. L. Rev. (2017) pp. 253–
263, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/mlr116&i=265. [Accessed 
2018-02-21]. 
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Therefore, it is possible that a moral-hazard problem would occur within the 
MNEs operations.59  
 
The principle of limited liability has a young history and cannot exist without 
the foundational principle of separating legal entities. This principle has 
positive implications on the MNE because it accepts that the liability of each 
entity is limited.60 For the parent company this is important because it 
prevents the liability for harm from moving upwards in the value chain of the 
enterprise.61 For the right-holders on the other hand, the principles of the 
separation of entities and limited liability are legal barriers in reaching the 
parent company for remediation.62  
3.2 Rules of Attribution  
The principle of separate legal entities and limited liability are the 
cornerstones in company law which makes the corporate form attractive to 
pursue trade both domestically and internationally. Almost anyone can start 
a company and the risks of the shareholders are relatively low due to the 
protection provided by these principles. The loss of the shareholder is limited 
to the amount invested in the company.  
 
Under some circumstances corporate acts, such as the acts of a subsidiary, 
may lead to corporate liability of the parent company. In private law, there 
are rules of attribution which determine which acts are acts of the company. 
For example, there are rules concerning ‘company agents’ under which the 
company is liable for the acts of the agent, and rules about ‘vicarious liability’ 
which determine which acts of an employee constitute acts of the company.63  
                                               
59 See Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, p. 100.  
60 See Phillip I. Blumberg, ‘The Corporate Entity in an era of Multinational Corporations’, 
15:2 Del. J. Corp. L., (1990) pp. 285–286, available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/decor15&i=291. [Accessed 2018-02-19]; and 
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, p. 576.  
61 See Mares, Legalizing Human Rights Due Diligence and the Separation of Entities 
Principle, pp. 268–269. 
62 See section 2.2 above and Principle 26, UNGPs. 
63 See Brenda Hannigan, Company Law, 4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 68.  
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Liabilities of the company is governed by rules of attribution in contract, tort 
and criminal law, and the rules of attribution vary depending on domestic 
laws and regulations. In general, the company can only be liable for the acts 
of an agent or employee if the agent or the employee act within its authority 
or employment.64  
3.2.1 Contract Liability 
Previous attempts have been made in attributing liability for harm caused by 
a legal entity within an MNE to a parent or a buying company. In contract 
law the basic situation that would invoke certain rules of attribution is when 
a parent or buying company has a business relationship with another legal 
entity (subsidiary, supplier or contractor) who have caused harm to right-
holders. In order to hold the parent company liable for other legal entities 
harms, the court must unveil the ‘company on top’ from its limited liability.65 
 
In some situations, the court may look at a principal-agent relationship 
between the parent company and another legal entity within an MNE. A 
subsidiary, supplier or other entity may negotiate or take corporate actions on 
behalf of the parent or buying company – i.e. act as an agent. In those 
situations, contractual liability attaches to the parent as the contracting party 
and not to the agent who have acted on behalf of the parent or buying 
company. Depending on the damages the third party may suffer or who has 
been the agent, common law and civil law differs in rules of attribution and 
possible remedies.66   
                                               
64 See the rules of attribution in English common law in Hannigan, Company Law, p. 68–91; 
See Chap. 29–30 in Swedish Commercial Legislation (2005:551) governing rules of 
attribution in tort and criminal law. 
65 See Hannigan, Company Law, p. 68; piercing of the corporate veil will be discussed 
furtherer in section 3.3.1 ’Piercing the Corporate Veil’ below.  
66 Compare Hannigan, Company Law, pp. 69–70; and the Swedish Commercial Agency Act 
(1991:351) (Lag om handelsagentur). If a decision or contract have been negotiated by the 
company director or manager which have caused a third party a financial loss, the company 
may be liable in tort and not in contract. The plaintiff may seek compensation on the basis of 
1§ Chap. 29 of the Swedish Commercial Legislation (2005:551) (Aktiebolagslagen); or if the 
financial loss has emerged due to a personal damage or property damage, the plaintiff may 
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In the context of business and human rights, the claimant must therefore argue 
that the parent company can be held liable in contract because the agent (most 
likely a subsidiary) have acted under its authority and the commitments were 
made within the capacity of the company.67 In this context, the claimant must 
focus on the relationship between the entity that have caused the claimant 
harm and the parent company. To attribute harms to a parent in contract law 
would require the claimant to prove some sort of fraud or misrepresentation 
of the parent company by using another legal entity within the MNE for 
purposes of shielding themselves from liabilities.68  
 
Not long ago, a garment factory in Bangladesh called Rana Plaza collapsed. 
The collapse of this building was the worst industrial accident in the world 
since the gas leak in Bhopal. The Rana Plaza collapse killed more than 1 100 
workers and many more was seriously injured.69  
 
The Rana Plaza garment factory was a part of several MNEs value chains, 
where the buyer companies or brands was located in the US and Canada. Due 
to these circumstances, two individuals filed complaints against J.C. Penny 
Corporation in a US court and against Loblaw in a Canadian court.70 The 
principle of limited liability is fundamental, and the general rule is that a 
general contractor, such as J.C. Penny Corporation, is not liable for an 
independent contractor’s acts or omissions, if they have not undertaken any 
such responsibilities according to the contract.71 Neither J.C. Penny 
                                               
seek compensation on the basis of the Swedish Tort Liability Act (1972:207) 
(Skadeståndslag). 
67 See Hannigan, Company Law, p. 69 and 183. 
68 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’, 52 
U. Chi. L. Rev. (1985), p. 112, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h 
=hein.journals/uclr52&i=103. [Accessed 2018-05-15].  
69 See Justine Nolan, ’Rana Plaza: the collapse of a factory in Bangladesh and its 
ramifications for the global garment industry’ in Dorothée Baumann-Pauly and Justine 
Nolan, Business and Human Rigths: From principles to Practice p. 27.  
70 Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp., Inc, C.A. No. N15C-07-174 MMJ, (Superior Court of 
Delaware 4 May 2016); and Das v George Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 4129.  
71 Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp., Inc., p. 7.  
 24 
Corporation nor Loblaw had any control over their suppliers or sub-suppliers 
or used these independent contractors for shielding themselves from any 
liability that would arise through a contractual relationship with the 
claimants.72 
 
Attempts in attributing a liability for harm to the ‘company on top’ have had 
limited success in regards of transnational operations and a part of the issue 
is related to the nature of MNEs. They are complex in their structures and for 
a claimant it is difficult to put forward proof of any circumstances that would 
‘lift the corporate veil’ and invoke a contract liability for a parent or buying 
company. Due to these difficulties we may proceed with our next section on 
tort law.  
3.2.2 Tort Liability  
Tort litigations have been successful in holding MNEs liable for human rights 
violations in transnational operations73 and corporate liability in tort have 
been the centre of discussion in many transnational litigations processes.74 
The question is whether a parent company or buying company can be liable 
in tort for acts or omissions of a subsidiary or supplier. In transnational 
litigation processes against a parent or a buying company, there may be cases 
in which managers of the parent or buying company actively contribute to the 
                                               
72 Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp.,; and Das v George Weston Limited, at para 539–540.  
73 For an overview of cases involving tort litigations, see Richard Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation 
against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the 
Position Outside the United States’, 3 City U. H. K. L. Rev., (2011), pp. 1 and 4, available 
at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ciunhok3&i=9. [Accessed 2018-05-11].  
74 See Philipp Wesche and Miriam Saage-Maaß, ‘Holding Companies Liable for Human 
Rights Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers before German Civil Courts: 
Lessons from Jabir and Others v KiK’, Hum. Rts. L. Rev, 16 (2016), pp. 370–372 and 377, 
available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngw004. [Accessed 2018-05-10]; Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum 133 S.Ct 1659 (2013) (USA); Friday Alfred Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell Plc 
District Court of The Hague, 30 January 2013, Case No C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580 (The 
Netherlands); Oguru v Royal Dutch Shell Plc District Court of The Hague, 30 January 2013, 
Case No C/09/ 330891/HA ZA 09-0579 (The Netherlands); Lubbe and Others v Cape Plc 
and Related Appeals [2000] UKHL 41 (The United Kingdom); Muhammad Jabir and Others 
v KiK Textilien und Non-Food GmbH – 7 O 95/15 (District Court of Dortmund, settled out 
of court); and Case TR T 1012-13 (Arica v Boliden) (District Court of Skellefteå, Decision 8 
March 2018). 
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harmful operations of the subsidiary or supplier. In other cases, the parent or 
the buying company do not actively contribute to the harmful acts but fail to 
prevent them.75 
 
Tort law covers both vicarious liabilities and allegations based on the parent 
companies (or buying companies) own negligence in their ‘duty of care’ owed 
to the claimants. A company is a legal entity whose acts or omissions are 
committed through humans and not necessarily by a commercial agent with 
whom the company has a contractual relationship.76 The general rule is that a 
principal is liable to a third party for damages caused by the agent or 
employee through act or omissions, when the agent or employee have acted 
within the scope of its authority or employment.77 Vicarious liability is 
dependent on the act or omission of the agent or employee, not by act or 
omission of the company itself because the company has a strict responsibility 
for the harms caused by its agents or employees.78 Taking the liability in tort 
further and place it in the context would suggest that a parent or a buying 
company can be held liable for damages of its subsidiary, supplier or 
contractor. According to the general rule, the owning or controlling parent 
company would be shielded from liabilities in tort due to the principle of 
‘limited liability’ in private law.79   
 
                                               
75 See Wesche and Saage-Maaß, Holding Companies Liable for Human Rights Abuses, p. 
377.  
76 See Hannigan, Company Law, p. 70.  
77 Chap. 3, 1§ of the Swedish Tort Liability Act (1972:207) (Skadeståndslag); Mårten 
Schultz, Skadeståndslag (1972:207), 3 kap. 1 §, Lexino 2013-05-31, available at 
https://pro.karnovgroup.se/document/1390745/1. [Accessed 2018-03-06].; ”(…) the general 
rule that the principal is liable to third persons in a civil suit ‘for the frauds, deceits, 
concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or 
misfeasances, and omissions of duty of his agent in the course of his employment , although 
the principal did not authorise, or justify, or participate in, or indeed know of such 
misconduct, or even if he forbade the acts, or disapproved of them.” Lloyd v Grace, Smith & 
Co., [1912] AC 716, p. 737 (HL).  
78 ’Strict responsibility’ means that the company has the responsible of its agents and 
employees acts even if the company itself have not done anything wrong, see Mårten Schultz, 
Skadeståndslag (1972:207), 3 kap. 1 §, Lexino 2013-05-31; NJA 1977 s. 639 (Swedish 
Supreme Court); and Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co. 
79 See section 3.1. ’Legal entities and Limited Liability’ above.  
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Attempts in making a vicarious liability claim have been made in common 
and civil law jurisdictions. Such attempts have been through the doctrine of 
‘piercing the corporate veil’ and some attempts have been more successful 
than others.80 
 
In the litigations after the collapse of Rana Plaza, the plaintiffs also claimed 
that Loblaw had been negligent in their ‘duty of care’ owed to the plaintiffs, 
based on the common law doctrine of vicarious liability.81 The court 
concluded that Loblaw did not have the right, ability nor the duty to control 
the suppliers, sub-suppliers or sub-contractors, because they were not a part 
of the enterprise as agents, employees or contractors which could trigger that 
kind of liability.82 Therefore, Loblaw could not be held vicarious liable for 
the acts taken by its suppliers, sub-suppliers nor sub-contractors.83  
 
Another aspect of tort law is regarding the parent or buying company own 
contribution to the harm through their own negligence in their ’duty of care’ 
owed to the claimant. Plaintiffs in a majority of transnational litigations argue 
that a parent or buying company should be liable in tort by its own negligence. 
In the past two decades some significant developments have been put forward 
in common law courts regarding the tort of ‘negligence’.84  
 
To successfully claim a tort of negligence, the claimant must show that the 
parent company had been negligent in its duty of care which would invoke a 
                                               
80 The doctrine of ’veil piercing’ will be examined in section 3.3.1. For example, see Choc v 
Hudbay Minerals Inc 2013 ONSC 1414 (Canada); NJA 2014 s 877 (Swedish Supreme 
Court); and Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 (Supreme Court).  
81 Das v George Weston Limited, at para 125.   
82 Das v George Weston Limited, at paras 459, 469, 470–471 and 481.  
83 Das v George Weston Limited, at paras 434–435, 457 and 537. In this decision the court 
examined laws of Bangladesh, Canada and England and came to the same conclusion in each 
of the analyses – that Loblaw did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. 
84 For example, see In Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India 
in December 1984, D.C. S.D. New York Opinion, 12 May 1986 (The United States); 
Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; Caparo Industries Pic v Dickman [1990] 1 All 
ER 568 (HL) (The United Kingdom). For more case law from the United Kingdom, see 
Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: 
An Overview of the Position Outside the United States, p. 4.  
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direct liability on the parent company. Under English law, a duty of care arises 
for the parent company when a three-stage test is met, which will be examined 
furtherer in section 3.3.2 below.85  
 
Tort law, especially the tort of negligence, has implications in reducing legal 
barriers to provide access to remedy in domestic courts. The remedy would 
be provided directly from the parent company or buying company to the 
claimant as a compensation for damages. To avoid claims, the parent 
company (and other companies at the top of the MNEs value chain) would 
have to oblige to its responsibility to respect human rights by pursuing due 
diligence throughout its value chain and actively engage in remediation 
through state-based grievance mechanisms.86  
3.2.3 Criminal Liability  
The third option for liability of the company, is through criminal liability. 
Criminal liability has been considered in transnational litigations involving 
MNEs but have had limited success in developing an effective grievance 
because of two main obstacles: some jurisdictions does not recognise criminal 
liability of legal persons, or domestic courts do not recognise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for criminal defences.87  
 
In English common law, a company can be a subject to criminal liability, but 
there are some limitations in the type of offences a legal entity can commit. 
The intention or knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes a part of a crime 
(mens rea), and the action or conduct which is a constituent element of a crime 
(actus reus) can be sought in the relevant officer, agent or employee.88 
                                               
85 Chandler v Cape Plc, at para 62; and Caparo Industries Pic v Dickman.  
86 See Pillar 2 and 3 in the UNGPs; and OECD Guidelines pp. 19–20 and 31–34.  
87 See Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorguodale, Oliver De Shutter and Andie Lambe, The 
Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational 
Business, December 2013, International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), p. 
15–16 and 47–52, available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725 
e25fcd45aa446/t/58657dfa6a4963597fed598b/1483046398204/The-Third-Pillar-
FINAL1.pdf [accessed 2018-05-11]. 
88See Hannigan, Company Law, p. 77. 
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Swedish civil law differs from English common law. According to Swedish 
law, a company cannot pursue a criminal act, only a natural person of the 
company can. A legal person cannot commit a crime and therefore a company 
cannot be criminally sanctioned, only sanctioned with a fine, forfeiture or a 
tort. Any criminal wrongdoings must have been done by a natural person, for 
example the director, manager or an employee of the company. Some acts are 
criminally sanctioned in the Swedish Commercial Legislation and these rules 
are lex specialis to the Swedish Penal Code.89 A company can be sanctioned 
with a corporate fine or forfeiture due to a crime committed by a director, 
manager or employee of the company.90 If a plaintiff claims that the company 
should be sanctioned with a corporate fine or forfeiture, the claim is civil and 
based on a vicarious liability.91  
 
Attributing a criminal liability to a parent company or a buying company 
would require the claimant to establish that the parent or buying company 
itself have been involved in the actual crime or the parent or buying company 
have acted as a complicit in the crime of the subsidiary or supplier.92  
 
States are not prohibited from applying extraterritorial jurisdiction, but 
neither required to provided extraterritorial protection.93 However, holding a 
parent or a buying company liable in criminal law is not possible in all 
jurisdictions since some states do not recognise criminal offences of 
                                               
89 1§ Chap. 30 of The Swedish Commercial Legislation; The Swedish Penal Code (1962:700) 
(Brottsbalk); and Clas Bergström & Per Samuelsson, Aktiebolagets grundproblem,5th ed. 
Norstedts Juridik, Stockholm, 2015, p. 122. 
90 Chap. 1. 3§ and 8§ of The Swedish Penal Code; See commentary by Magnus Ulväng, 
Brottsbalk (1962:700), 1 kap. 3§, Lexino 2017-08-18, available at: https://pro-karnovgroup-
se.ludwig.lub.lu.se/document/2394339/1. [Accessed 2018-03-07].  
91 Chap. 1. 8§, and Chap. 36 (Fine and Forfeiture) of the Swedish Penal Code; Vicarious 
Liability in 3 Chap. 1§, Swedish Tort Liability Act.  
92 Such cases have been tried in both civil law and common law jurisdictions, for example: 
and Doe et al. v Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., Case No. 12-14898-B (11th Circ. 2014) (the US); 
see also Danzer Group & SIFORCO lawsuits, DLH lawsuit and Chiquita Lawsuits in Skinner 
et al., The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by 
Transnational Business, pp. 47–48, 116–119 and 120–122.  
93 Principle 2, UNGPs; and OECD Guidelines pp. 3, 7–8, 67.  
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corporations.94 Even if some jurisdiction do recognise extraterritorial 
jurisdictions for criminal offences the type of offences are often limited to 
international crimes, which do not cover all types of human rights abuses.95 
Therefore, criminal liabilities of parent companies are not particularly a 
preferable approach to obtain remediation from parent companies for human 
rights abuse caused by an affiliate or other business partner.  
3.3 Accountability concepts  
To effectively seek remedy from a company the claimant must establish a link 
between the company and the actor under the rules of attribution. In some 
cases, the claimants succeeded, but in too many cases the claimants have 
failed.96 But some circumstances make it possible for the court to challenge 
the fundamental principles of private law. In the following sections I will 
discuss the concepts of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ and ‘direct liability’ 
which have received a lot of attention in the debate on parent company 
liability for human right abuses.  
 
Some significant developments in parent company liability have been 
achieved within the domestic courts of Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Sweden, and these developments will be explored further in the following 
chapters. 
3.3.1 Piercing the corporate veil  
The fundamental rule in private law, is that no one is liable for the harms 
caused by another. By using complex corporate structures, shareholders such 
as parent companies, can protect themselves from legal liability when a 
                                               
94 For example, Sweden does not recognise criminal liabilities on legal entities, The Swedish 
Penal Code; and Bergström & Samuelsson, Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p. 122. 
95 See Skinner et a., The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights 
Violations by Transnational Business, p. 15–16 and 47–52.  
96 See for example regarding contract law Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp., Inc.   
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supplier, subsidiary or contractor causes harm to right-holders.97 This rule 
does not apply when the parent company have contributed to the harm itself, 
which requires the claimants to establish a link between the harm and the 
parent company’s own contribution. If the parent company itself have 
contributed to the harm, then it can be held liable for human rights 
violations.98 
 
Piercing the corporate veil is an exception to the rule of limited liability on 
reasons of fairness. If there would be no exception, injustice would be 
perpetrated if victims were left without remedy. In some cases, the 
circumstances might make it possible to overcome the limited liability and 
hold the shareholders, including parent companies, liable of harm caused by 
another entity within the MNE. This legitimate exception establishes an 
opportunity for the court to disregard the separateness of entities.99 
 
Various jurisdictions have set forth tests where the plaintiffs can satisfy 
certain factors to pierce the corporate veil and the requirements have varied 
depending on domestic law. The doctrine of veil piercing have been used in 
both tort and contract, and there are three identified exceptions for 
disregarding the separateness of the entity. An exception exists if its 
supported by i) laws and regulations or a contract, or ii) when the subsidiary 
have acted as the parent company’s agent, or iii) when the parent company 
exercises such dominion and/or control over the subsidiary that separate 
entities no longer exist, and the parent is using the subsidiary as a shield for 
fraudulent or improper behaviour.100 
                                               
97 See Richard Meeran, ’The Unveiling of Transnational Corporations: A Direct Approach’ 
in Michael Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999, pp. 161–162.  
98 See Mares, Legalizing Human Rights Due Diligence and the Separation of Entities 
Principle, p. 269.  
99 See Mares, Legalizing Human Rights Due Diligence and the Separation of Entities 
Principle, p. 269.  
100 See Meredith Dearborn, ‘Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for 
Corporate Groups’, 97:1 Cal. L. Rev. (2009), p. 203–204, available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/calr97&i=197. [Accessed 2018-02-21]; and 
Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, para. 45; and NJA 2014 s. 877 (Swedish Supreme Court), the 
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According to Swedish case law, it is possible to pierce the corporate veil 
when: i) the company is under such control by the owner, or it does not 
operate as a separate entity of the owner101, and ii) if the company is used by 
the owner to pursue improper behaviour which causes harm or damages to 
another company or person.102 The Swedish Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that some circumstances may require the court to pierce the 
corporate veil, but that the principle is only established in practice and should 
not be used excessively.103  
 
In the United Kingdom, the pathway to pierce the corporate veil has been 
more rocky and uncertain than in Swedish case law. The Supreme Court has 
been going back and forth discussing the concept of piercing the corporate 
veil but have concluded that some circumstances justify an exception to the 
rule of limited liability of separate legal personalities.104  
 
Under the US common law, the plaintiffs must show that: i) the shareholder 
(for example a parent company) exercises dominion and/or control over the 
subsidiary whereby separate entities no longer exists; and ii) that the 
shareholder has engaged in harm that suggests, in the absence of piercing, that 
injustice will be perpetrated using the corporate form.105  
 
Limited liability affects victims, because the concept may encourage MNEs 
to take greater risks of adverse human rights impacts by externalizing the 
costs that those risks may impose on the public.106 By piercing the veil the 
                                               
court acknowledge that it may exist an exception to the rule of limited liability, especially 
when the case involves an involuntary creditor and when the company have been used for 
improper behaviour which have caused the creditor damages.  
101 NJA 1935 s 81 and NJA 1975 s 45 (Swedish Supreme Court Decisions).  
102 NJA 2014 s 877.  
103 NJA 2014 s 877, pp. 889–890.   
104 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 (Supreme Court) at para 35; and Salomon 
v Salomon & Co Ltd.  
105 See Dearborn, Enterprise Liability, pp. 203–204.  
106 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, pp. 107–109.  
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parent company can be held liable for harms caused within their supply chain, 
the parent company will have to consider human rights impacts throughout 
its operations.  
 
Because of the various factors that have to be met in the veil piercing test, the 
concept of veil piercing has met critique due to unpredictable outcomes in 
court.107 Academics also believe that the concept has been ill-conceived.108 
Furthermore, academics have studied the court decisions, and the study have 
shown that the courts are reluctant to or appear not to be moving towards 
permitting piercing the veil in more cases.109  
3.3.2 Direct liability   
Piercing the veil can be complicated and the outcomes can be unpredictable 
in court. Therefore, plaintiffs have tried other ways to go about corporate 
liability of parent companies for harmed caused by a subsidiary, supplier or 
contractor. Another way to reach the parent company is through ‘direct 
liability’. To trigger that kind of liability in tort, the plaintiff must establish a 
parent company’s negligence. The plaintiffs must show that the parent 
company owed them a duty of care, and that the company had been negligent 
in its duty which would invoke direct liability on the parent company.110 
 
Under English law, a duty of care arises for the parent company when a three-
stage test is met. In the first stage, the claimant must show that there was 
sufficient proximity in the relationship between the parent company and its 
subsidiary. Secondly, the harm must be foreseeable for the parent company, 
                                               
107 See in general the critique in Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Abolishing Veil Piercing’, 26:3 J. 
Corp. L. (2001), pp. 479–536, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL 
/P?h=hein.journals/jcorl26&i=489. [Accessed 2018-02-21]. 
108 See in general Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, pp. 89–138. 
109 Due to the debate, Robert B. Thompson did an empirical study on veil piercing and 
discovered that courts were more reluctant in piercing the veil in tort contexts than in contract 
contexts. He also concluded that “Courts do not appear to be moving toward permitting 
piercing in more and more situations.”, Robert B. Thompson, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: 
An Empirical Study’, 76 Cornell L. Rev. (1990-1991), p. 1048, available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/clqv76&i=1058. [Accessed 2018-02-21]. 
110 See section 3.2.2. ’Tort liability’ above.  
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and at last, it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the parent 
company.111  
 
In general, to successfully attribute direct liability to the parent company, four 
conditions must be proved to exist:  
1) The defendant had a duty of care owed to the claimant, and  
2) That duty has been breached, and  
3) The company’s breach in their duty of care resulted in a damage or 
loss to the claimant, and  
4) The damage suffered was not too remote to justify compensation in 
the circumstances.112 
 
Keeping these conditions in mind, we ought to look at some of the case 
developments in both common and civil law jurisdictions. In the English case 
of Chandler v Cape Plc and the Canadian case of Choc v Hudbay Minerals 
the courts established that a parent company can be held directly liable for 
their subsidiaries actions if the parent company have failed in their duty of 
care owed to the subsidiary’s employees or to people with whom the 
subsidiary has interacted with. These cases are of importance because it is the 
first time common law courts established a direct liability for parent 
company’s due to harm caused by a subsidiary.113  
 
In the case of Chandler v Cape Plc the Court of Appeal recognised that the 
relationship between the parent company and the subsidiary was closer than 
in a normal parent/subsidiary relationship. The relationship between Cape Plc 
                                               
111 Chandler v Cape Plc, at para 62; and Caparo Industries Pic v Dickman.   
112 Jennifer Zerk, Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rigths Abuses: Towards a Fairer 
and More Effective System of Domestic Law Remedies, report prepared for the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2013), p. 44, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/ 
StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf. [Accessed 2018-02-28]. 
113 Chandler v Cape Plc, at para 62; and Choc v Hudbay Minerals, at paras 24–25: See 
Gwynne Skinner, ‘Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign 
Subsidiarie’s Violations of International Human Rights Law’, 72:4 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.,   
(2015), p. 1832, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/wasl 
ee72&i=1826. [Accessed 2018-02-26] 
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and its subsidiary met the second condition of ‘sufficient proximity’ in the 
parent/subsidiary relationship because of Cape Plc’s strong involvement in 
the safety and health policy of its subsidiary’s employees.114  
 
Due to this relationship, the court was allowed to consider parent liability 
based on ’assumption of responsibility’ for the health and safety practices of 
its subsidiary. Cape Plc’s acts and omissions in this respect caused harm for 
the plaintiffs.115 The harm consisted in the exposure of asbestos to the 
employee who later on suffered from a lung disease. Because of Cape Plc’s 
involvement in the control of the health and safety in its subsidiary’s business, 
the harm must have been foreseeable for Cape Plc and it could have, through 
its policy and strategy methods, prevented the subsidiary from exposing the 
employee to asbestos dust.116 The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower 
court, that it was fair, just and reasonable for a duty of care to exist because 
of the sufficient proximity in the relationship between the parent and the 
subsidiary company.117  
 
In the Canadian case of Choc v Hudbay Minerals, the claimants were not 
employees but indigenous people of the Mayan Q’eqchi’, who was entitled to 
the lands where Hudbay Minerals pursued their mining operations through its 
subsidiary.118 The subsidiary of Hudbay Minerals hired security people to 
protect the mining projects, and the security people committed grave human 
rights abuses against the indigenous people.119  
 
The claimants argued that Hudbay Minerals whas directly liable for these 
abuses because of their negligence in the duty of care owed to the indigenous 
people. The Canadian court used a similar test as the court in Chandler v Cape 
                                               
114 Chandler v Cape Plc, at paras 61, 72–75 and 79.   
115 Chandler v Cape Plc, at para 62.  
116 Cape Plc had a doctor who did research on the link between asbestos dust and asbestosis 
and related diseases, Chandler v Cape Plc, at paras 75–78.  
117 Chandler v Cape PLC.  
118 Choc v Hudbay Minerals, at paras 11–13. 
119 Grave abuses including killing and rapes Choc v Hudbay Minerals, at paras 4–7.  
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Plc, and established that Hudbay Minerals, might owe a duty of care to the 
claimant and that it is conceivable that Hudbay had been negligent in that 
duty. The defendants motion to dismiss the case was rejected and plaintiffs 
were allowed to proceed and bring evidence substantiating a duty of care 
exists and was breached.120 
 
Recently, a Swedish court tried the case of Arica Victims v Boliden Minerals. 
Arica Victims, a Swedish firm representing 707 Chilean plaintiffs, claimed 
that Boliden was responsible for damages the residents of Arica in Chile have 
suffered due to negligent dumping and mismanagement of toxic waste from 
the Swedish company Boliden. 121 During the 1980s, especially between 
1984–1985, Boliden extracted copper at their facilities in Sweden.122 By these 
operations, Boliden collected a toxic waste containing high levels of arsenic, 
mercury, lead and cadmium. Boliden decided to export their toxic waste to 
Promel, a Chilean company. Promel were supposed to process the toxic waste 
at their facilities in the north east part of the town Arica but stopped with their 
operations and left the toxic waste at their facilities.123 Arica Victims claimed 
that Boliden was directly liable for the damages the residents of Arica had 
suffered because Boliden had been negligent in their duty of care owed to the 
plaintiffs.124 The Swedish court ruled in favour of Boliden, because Arica 
Victims failed to prove that the negligence dumping of toxic waste by Boliden 
had caused the poor health of the residents in Arica.125  
 
                                               
120 The Canadian court called it the ‘Anns test’, Choc v Hudbay Minerals, at paras 57–75; 
and compare with Chandler v Cape PLC.  
121 Arica v Boliden Case TR T 1012-13 (District Court of Skellefteå, Decision 8 March 2018). 
This decision has been appealed by Arica Victims to the Court of Appeal in Umeå, Sweden, 
see press release by Arica Victims, Göran Starkebo, Jonas Ebbesson och Johan Öberg, ‘Arica 
Victims överklagar Skellefteå tingsrätts dom i målet mot Boliden Mineral’ (25 March 2018),  
http://caratlaw.se/pm-overklagande/. [Accessed 2018-05-17].  
122 Arica v Boliden, pp. 8–9.  
123 Arica v Boliden, pp. 8–9.   
124 Arica v Boliden, p. 17.   
125 Arica v Boliden, pp. 122–123.  
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The claimants succeeded in proving that Boliden owed the residents of Arica 
a duty of care, and that this duty had been breached.126 Boliden pursued due 
diligence towards Promel, and findings by its own employees indicated that 
the toxic waste was not processed or properly taken care of, which could risk 
damages.127 However, Arica Victims failed to prove that the breach of 
Boliden’s duty had a causal link with the actual damages of the environment 
and the poor health of the residents.128  
 
Corporate liability in tort is still under development and time-consuming 
litigation processes have been brought to courts in the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands.129 The cases are still on-going and applies to environmental 
damages caused abroad by subsidiaries to companies domiciled in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In one of the cases, the claimants have 
argued that not only does the parent company have a duty of care owed to the 
employees of its subsidiary, but also to those affected by their operations.130 
Depending on the outcomes of the courts decisions, a successful claim in the 
United Kingdom could have broader applications to other transnational 
human rights litigations in common law countries.131 However, the 
predicaments are uncertain and simply speculations.  
3.4 Summary  
Academics and courts have been challenging the fundamental rules of private 
law by developing doctrines such as ‘veil piercing’ and using tort of 
negligence as a way to attach a liability to the top of the corporate structure, 
                                               
126 Arica v Boliden, p. 134 and 137.   
127 Boliden had fail to act when their employees discovered that the toxic waste would be left 
uncovered and not processed furtherer by Promel. This discovery should have indicated that 
the operations could risk damaging the environment or the people living in the area, Arica v 
Boliden, p. 130.   
128 Arica v Boliden, pp. 122–123. 
129 Friday Alfred Akpan et al v Shell; Okpabi v Shell, [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC); Longowe v 
Vedanta, [2017] EWCA Civ 1528. 
130 Friday Alfred Akpan et al v Shell; Okpabi v Shell; and Longowe v Vedanta.  
131 Okpabi v Shell; and Longowe v Vedanta. See more about key-developments at 
http://www.bhrinlaw.org/key-developments. 
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grasping after a liability of a parent or a buying company. Attributing a 
corporate liability to a parent company has been a hurdle, but academics and 
courts have carried on in developing the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil and applying it in a transnational context. The outcomes in courts have 
varied and the most significant developments have appeared in common law 
courts. In common law, courts have the authority to form doctrines into law 
and they seem to be more willing to expand these rules than civil law 
courts.132 
 
Academics have argued that there may be other ways to go about a parent 
company liability, arguing that abandoning previous attempts are the way 
forward.133 Peter B. Oh134, have argued that the doctrine of ‘veil-piercing’ 
have been ill-conceived and does not work as a legitimate exception to the 
fundamental rule of limited liability in private law.135 The various conditions 
set forth in court in order to ‘pierce the corporate veil’, or the facts that have 
to be laid down in court to prove a tort claim, makes it difficult to attribute a 
liability to the parent company.136 From a rule of law approach, claims in veil 
piercing and tort law are unpredictable and courts have been reluctant in 
piercing the corporate veil of MNEs.137 
                                               
132 For example, compare the courts decisions of the Swedish Supreme Court in NJA 2014 s. 
877 pp. 889–890, with the UK Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd.  
133 See in general Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, pp. 479–536; and Skinner, 
Rethinking Limited Liability pp. 1769–1864. 
134 Professor in Law at the University of Pittsburgh. He writes and teaches in the areas of 
Agency & Partnership, Business Organizations, Corporate Finance, Law & Economics and 
Securities Regulation. His research focuses on i.a. corporate procedures and remedies.  
135 See in general Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, pp. 89–138.  
136 For example, in Arica v Boliden the claimants proved to the district court that the company 
had been negligent, but they failed to prove that the negligence contributed to or caused the 
harm.  
137 See Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Viel: An Empirical Study, pp. 1036–1074; and in 
Choc v Hudbay Minerals at paras 43–48, the Canadian court examined the conditions in ’veil-
piercing’ but concluded that both the plaintiffs and the defendants’ references were primarily 
based on the direct liability of the defendant. 
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4 Revisiting an old concept  
In the search for an effective grievance and access to remedy, the right-
holders have stumbled on the finish line, failing to achieve remediation due 
to legal barriers in private law. Attempts have been made to reach beyond the 
principles of separate legal entities and limited liability through the rules of 
attribution and the concept of piercing the corporate veil. Attributing direct 
liability in tort to the parent or buying company and piercing the corporate 
veil are not effective enough because the outcomes are unpredictable and 
casual chains are difficult to prove in court.138  
 
The origin of unjust enrichment is a theory of recovery whose task is to fill 
gaps left uncovered by traditional legal categories such as contract, tort and 
property law.139 Unlike veil-piercing, the doctrine operates independent of the 
type of claim, corporation, or shareholder involved and is focused on the flow 
of unjust benefits.140 The doctrine of unjust enrichment seems to fit in other 
non-traditional areas of law as well, for example in environmental law, 
international law and in human rights law.141 It is possible that the doctrine 
does have a gap-filling function in the context of parent company liability in 
human rights law. Therefore, I will dedicate this chapter to revisiting a 
concept of unjust enrichment and apply it in the context of parent company 
liability for human rights abuses.  
                                               
138 Arica v Boliden Minerals: it was possible to prove that Boliden had been negligent, but 
the plaintiffs failed to prove that the negligence caused them damages; and see Weinbaum, 
Unjust Enrichment: An Alternative to Tort Law and Human Rights in the Climate Change 
Context, pp. 438, 440–441.  
139 According to Birks, the principle of unjust enrichment belongs to the law of restitution, 
which is separate from ‘contract’ and ‘tort’, Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 
16; and David N. Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of 
Indigenous Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 629.  
140 See Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, pp. 123–124.  
141 See Weinbaum, Unjust Enrichment: An Alternative to Tort Law and Human Rights in the 
Climate Change Context, pp. 429–454; Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust 
Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples against Multinational Corporations, pp. 626–663; 
Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, pp. 89–138; and Fombad, The Principle of Unjust Enrichment 
in International Law, pp. 120–130.  
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4.1 Unjust Enrichment 
The right to compensation for harms caused by a company can traditionally 
arise in contract, tort or criminal law.142 The theory behind the right to 
compensation is a loss-based recovery where the claimant has the right to 
compensation because the defendant has to make good a loss suffered by the 
claimant.143 The law of compensation should not be confused with the law of 
restitution. Restitution is a gain-based recovery which covers an area of law 
in where we find the principle of unjust enrichment. A claim of unjust 
enrichment gives the claimant a right to restitution – a gain-based recovery.144  
 
The definition of restitution is that something is to be given back, implying 
that to whom a restitution is to be made is to regain something which he or 
she previously had, and which passed from him or her to the other. The most 
common case is a mistaken payment – someone gains something by mistake 
which invokes a right to restitution to whom who made the mistaken payment. 
There are several principles in common law which gives one a right to 
restitution, some principles are based on wrongs, likes breach of contract or 
tort, while others are based on unjust enrichment, like a mistaken payment.145 
 
Unjust enrichment can be explained as a causative event, an event from which 
rights arise. The right does not arise from something that is wrong, but rather 
from an enrichment at the expense of the claimant.146 The principle of unjust 
                                               
142 See in general ’rules of attribution’ section 3.2 above.  
143 See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2005), p. 
3.  
144 See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, pp. 11–12. 
145 The right to restitution for a mistaken payment is also known as ‘condictio indebiti’, Peter 
Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Clarendon, Oxford, (1985) p. 12; and 
Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3 ed., Oxford; Oxford University Press (2011), p. 
9. 
146 Separating between restitution for wrongs and restitution for unjust enrichment, see Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment, pp. 20–22; and Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 9–13.  
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enrichment is widely recognised in both common and civil law and it has a 
long history which can be traced back to Roman Law.147  
 
The principle of unjust enrichment is also known as a ‘corrective justice’ 
which maintains the objective of set right injustice that have occurred 
between individuals. In this sense, the principle of unjust enrichment fits the 
objective of private law. Even if modern theories of unjust enrichment differ 
in detail, they do share a number of important core features.148   
 
To successfully claim a right to restitution based on the principle of unjust 
enrichment, three elements must traditionally be proved in court; i) a receipt 
of a benefit, ii) enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense and iii) unjust retention 
of the benefit.149 The court must thereby ask themselves four questions:  
 
i) has the defendant been benefited (ie, enriched)?  
ii) was the enrichment at the claimant’s expense?  
iii) was the enrichment unjust? 
iv) are there any defences?150 
 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the elements of the principle of unjust 
enrichment may vary or require additional conditions to be met.151 The first 
                                               
147 “This is indeed by nature fair, that nobody should be made richer through loss to another 
(cum alterius detrimento)” and “It is fair by the law of nature that nobody should be made 
richer through loss and wrong to another (cum alterius detrimento et iniuria)” quoted in 
Birks, An Introduction of the Law of Restitution, pp. 22–23; see also Brice Dickson, ‘Unjust 
Enrichment: A Comparative Overview’, 54:1 Cambridge L. J. (1995), pp. 100–126, available 
at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/camblj54&i=118. [Accessed 2018-03-26].  
148 See Kit Barker, ’Understanding the Unjust Enrichment Principle in Private Law: A Study 
of the Concept and its Reasons’ in Jason W. Neyers, Mitchell McInnes and Stephen G.A. 
Pitel (red.), Understanding Unjust Enrichment, Hart, Oxford, (2004), p. 97; and in general, 
the study of Dickson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Overview, pp. 100–126.   
149 See Dickson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Overview, pp. 105–106; and Fagan, 
Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples 
against Multinational Corporations, pp. 640–641.  
150 Burrows has slightly modified the questions of Birks in The Law of Restitution, p. 27; 
comapare with Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 20–21.  
151 In general Dickson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Overview, pp. 100–126; In 
Swedish civil law the principle has been much criticised and a subject for debate since there 
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three questions have to be answered affirmatively and the fourth negatively if 
the claimant are to be entitled to restitution.152 The four questions will be 
examined furtherer in the following sections when applying the concept in 
context.  
4.2 Has the parent company been 
enriched?  
In the previous chapter of ’Private Law’ some key cases in the debate of 
corporate liability and human rights were highlighted. In this chapter some of 
the cases will be approached in the light of the law of restitution. Revisiting 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment as a ground for restitution would allow us 
to change the focus from attributing liability, to questions of whether there is 
an unjust enrichment of the parent or buying company at the expense of the 
claimant. The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not take into account the 
relationships between the entities within the corporate group. Therefore, the 
claimant does not have to prove any causal link between the damage and the 
operations of the parent company. The only causal link of importance is 
between the transfer of benefit from the claimant to the parent company. 
 
One of the first questions the court must ask, is whether the defendant has 
been enriched (or benefited). If the first question is not affirmed, there is no 
case of an unjust enrichment.153 The concept of enrichment can be quite broad 
                                               
is no statutory provision nor independent legal institute of unjust enrichment in Swedish law. 
See Jan Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden: Ett civilrättsligt 
problem i komparativ belysning, Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, (1950); and Hjalmar 
Karlgren, Obehörig vinst och värdeersättning, P A Norstedt & Söners förlag, Stockholm, 
(1982). See Mårten Schultz, Nya argumentationslinjer i förmögenhetsrätten: Obehörig vinst 
rediviva, SvJt, (2009) s. 946–959, available at: https://zeteo.nj.se/document/svjt 
_svjt2009_s79?searchItemId=15377831!2!svjt_svjt2009_s79. [Accessed 2018-03-28]; and 
Jori Munukka, Är obehörig vinst en rättsprincip?, Ny Juridik, Nr. 3 (2009), s. 26–34, 
available at: https://pro.karnovgroup.se/document/912361/1?frt=jori+munukka&hide 
_flash=1&page=1&rank=7. [Accessed 2018-03-28].  
152 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 27.  
153 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 27.  
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and the test of identifying an enrichment can vary.154 In many cases the 
question of ‘enrichment’ passes by unnoticed because the defendant has 
usually received money, which is the measure of wealth.155 In other 
circumstances it may be more difficult to distinguish any benefit on the 
defendant.  
 
Peter Birks dedicated a great part of his career to the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment and concluded that an enrichment (or benefit) must be a material 
gain because the law of restitution is a gain-based recovery.156 If not a 
material gain, an enrichment is at least something positive to the defendant, 
an accretion of wealth.157 Generally speaking, an enrichment or benefit is a 
value of some sort that the defendant has received.158  
 
Birks suggested that the courts may apply an objective and subjective test to 
examine whether the value transferred to the parent company is an 
enrichment. An enrichment or benefit can be either positively objective or 
negatively objective, and is a subjective benefit if the value at issue is an 
actual benefit to the receiving party.159  
 
The concept of unjust enrichment is not as developed or even recognised as a 
legal principle in Swedish law and therefore Swedish academics have not yet 
established a sophisticated test of what could constitute a benefit. According 
to the Swedish principle, a benefit is an accumulation of the defendant’s 
wealth which can be through means of money, objects or services.160 A 
typical enrichment would consist in acquisition of ownership, transfer of 
                                               
154 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 642; it can be identified as a material gain, 
see Birks, Unjust Enrichment, pp. 50–51.  
155 See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, p. 50.  
156 See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, p. 51. 
157 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 642. 
158 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 44–45. 
159 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 44–45 and 47.  
160 See Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden, p. 156. 
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another’s property, saving of an expense by an appropriation of property or 
services, and relief of obligations.161 
 
In the litigation processes after the collapse of Rana Plaza, it was clear that 
great MNEs are outsourcing their operations through a network of suppliers 
and contractors.162 In the Canadian court the claimants argued that Loblaw 
benefitted from the construction of a supplier and contractor network in where 
they could produce clothing to cheap labour costs overseas.163 These 
arguments may remind us of elements of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
However, the court could not find any circumstances pointing towards an 
enrichment at the expense of the claimants. Also, the claimants main purpose 
was to gain remediation by compensation of personal damages and not a 
restitution of benefits.164 
 
In the Swedish litigations, Arica Victims wrote in their complaint that by 
exporting their toxic waste, Boliden tried to avoid their responsibility and 
save an expense by paying the Chilean company 10 million SEK, instead of 
paying approximately 760 million SEK for retaining their waste in Sweden.165 
These arguments were not relevant for the court in determine whether Boliden 
had been negligent, and the plaintiffs claimed a right to a loss-based 
compensation instead of a restitution of the value Boliden received at the 
claimant’s expense.166  
 
The enrichment can be determined by Birks system of objective and 
subjective benefits. An objective benefit can be negative as in the case of 
Boliden, where the company saved an expense by exporting their toxic waste 
                                               
161 See Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden, p. 156. 
162 See Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp., Inc; Das v George Weston Limited; and discussion 
under section 3.2.1 ‘Rana Plaza’ above.  
163 Das v George Weston Limited, paras 269 and 272. 
164 See the difference between ‘restitution’ and ‘compensation’ in chapter 4 ‘Revisiting an 
old concept’ above; Das v George Weston Limited, paras 269 and 272.  
165 Arica v Boliden; and Complaint Filed by Arica Victims against Boliden Minerals, District 
Court of Skellefteå, 12 September 2013, ‘the Complaint by Arica Victims’, pp. 49–50.  
166 Arica v Boliden; and the Complaint by Arica Victims, pp. 49–50.  
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to Promel in Chile for 10 million SEK instead of paying 760 million SEK for 
processing and detaining their waste in Sweden.167 After the collapse of the 
Rana Plaza factory, the claimants could have argued in front of the Canadian 
court that Loblaw saved expenses through outsourcing to low cost 
manufacturing areas.168  
 
Because both Boliden and Loblaw has saved an expense which they otherwise 
would have to pay for, the saving was a factual and legal necessary expense 
which makes the benefit inconvertible. In theory the benefit thereby passes 
the test of both objective and subjective benefits.169 
 
If the enrichment is both objective and subjective, the next step is to determine 
when Boliden and the Canadian company was enriched. They were either 
enriched when they received the service or product, or when the benefit was 
commenced.170  
 
The companies could arguably have been enriched when they received the 
service or product.171 If the service or product was not yet received, it is 
possible to claim that the parent company was enriched when the benefit was 
commenced – because the claimant’s work and time spent would count as a 
value transferred to the company.172 If it would be difficult to identify a 
benefit with any degree of certainty, the court could look at certain 
                                               
167 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 116–12; and Burrows, The Law 
of Restitution, p. 49 
168 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 116–124; Burrows, The Law of 
Restitution, pp. 49–51; and Das v George Weston Limited.  
169 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 116–124; and Burrows, The Law 
of Restitution, pp. 49–51.  
170 Scholars do not agree on whether it is enough that the benefit has commenced, see Birks, 
An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 126–127, 129 and 232; and the critique on the 
’commenced’ argument by Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 45–47. 
171 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 45–47.  
172 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 126–127, 129 and 232. 
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characteristics of wealth, such as capacity to produce income or 
transferability.173 
 
A benefit can be either a service, object or money, and it is not impossible to 
evaluate the enrichment when the service is commenced because a save in 
expense is also an enrichment.174 Perhaps it would be difficult to prove in 
court an enrichment in service (work and time spent by the claimant) as a 
saved expense (savings in work and time for the defendant) that would have 
reasonably incurred for the parent company if they would disregard the final 
product. The result is dependent on the question if a commenced service 
would pass the subjective test in court. In the case of Loblaw and Boliden, 
both companies would otherwise have had to hire their own employees, 
buying products from another company or pursue the contractual obligations 
themselves if not the claimants would have done so.175  
 
When applying the first condition in the doctrine of unjust enrichment it 
seems possible to determine whether a company has benefited or been 
enriched even if it is through a network of supplier or contractor. Therefore, 
we may continue to the second element of an enrichment ‘at the expense of 
the claimant’.  
4.3 Is the parent company enriched on the 
claimant’s expense?  
If the first question of ‘enrichment’ is affirmed, the next question to examine 
is whether the defendant have been enriched ‘at the expense of the claimant’. 
There are some issues that arise in the relation to this element. The first issue 
is related to ‘correspondence’ – does the element require a correspondence or 
                                               
173 See Jack Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment: Essays on the Law of 
Restitution 209 (1991), referred to in Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust 
Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 642. 
174 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, p. 126–127, 129 and 232; and 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 44–45.  
175 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 116–124; and Burrows, The Law 
of Restitution, pp. 47–51. 
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equivalence between the claimant’s loss and the defendant’s gain? The 
second issue is regarding ‘third party’ constellations – can the claimant have 
restitution from the defendant when the benefit has been conferred by a third 
party?176  
4.3.1 Correspondence 
In some situations, the gain of the defendant is equal with the loss of the 
claimant, especially when the defendant has received money or an object. But 
a defendant can be enriched in a saved expense when he or she have received 
a service. Therefore, it is important to discuss whether the loss for the 
claimant must be equivalent with the gain of the defendant.  
 
If the parent company has been enriched at the expense of the claimant, the 
benefit or enrichment has been taken from the claimant or from the claimant’s 
property. This element does not require the claimant to prove equivalence 
between his or her loss and the gain of the defendant, or even a loss at all. The 
important fact is whether a transfer of value have passed from the claimant or 
the claimant’s property to the defendant, and if the claimant has suffered any 
undesired consequence.177  
 
Birks used the word ‘subtraction’ to explain the situation in where a defendant 
have gained something at the expense of the plaintiff. By using this word, 
Birks meant that a plaintiff is entitled to a restitution when it is proved that 
the plus to the defendant is a minus to the plaintiff.178 Andrew Burrows agree 
with this basic rule but goes further. The plus on the defendant must not be 
                                               
176 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 64. 
177 See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, p. 85; Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 66; and Fagan, 
Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples 
against Multinational Corporations, pp. 644–645; and James Edelman, ‘The Meaning of 
Loss and Enrichment’ in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and James Penner (eds.) 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment, Oxford University Press, New 
York (2009), p. 212–216,  available at: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/ 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567751.001.1/acprof-9780199567751. [Accessed 2018-04-09].  
178 See Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, p. 132.  
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equal with the minus of the plaintiff to establish an unjust enrichment.179 
According to Burrows, the claimant does not have to prove any loss at all, it 
is enough to establish that the unjust enrichment was at the expense of the 
claimant because the enrichment came from the claimant.180 
 
The defendant has been enriched at the claimant’s expense when the value 
has been transferred directly or indirectly from the claimant’s assets or 
labour.181 A gain can be the avoidance of a loss and loss can be a failure to 
obtain a gain. Also, a loss is not defined by monetary loss, the loss can be an 
undesired consequence for the claimant.182  
 
The ‘expense’ element can be discussed through the collapse of Rana Plaza183 
by questioning who bears the risks of harm. The workers in the factory of 
Rana Plaza (and other unsafe working conditions around the world in low 
cost manufacturing countries) carries the risk of a factory collapse or other 
accidents. Even if there is ‘just a risk’, such a risk can materialise, as it did in 
Rana Plaza, and the workers suffers the undesired consequences of the buying 
companies risk-outsourcing.184  
 
                                               
179 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 64.  
180 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 65; in other words, the enrichment must have 
been ’subtracted’ from the claimant, see Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, p. 
132; and Birks, Unjust Enrichment, p. 79–86. 
181 One approach is that ‘at the expense of’ requires the value to be transferred directly from 
the claimant to the defendant, see Edelman, The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment, pp. 212 
and 213–216; Edelman’s ‘directness’ requirement has been contested. Quoting Burrows, it 
is preferable to say that ‘at the expense of’ means that the gain to the defendant must comprise 
a transfer of value from the claimant which must be distinguished from a consequential gain 
resulting from that transfer, see Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 66. 
182 see Edelman, The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment, pp. 212 and 213–216.  
183 See section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. above where the cases where discussed.  
184 Vagueness of the claimant’s loss have been recognised in indigenous claims as well but 
can be defeated. “(…) The potential vagueness of these costs, however, does not defeat the 
expense element. The plaintiff’s loss need not necessarily equate with the defendant’s gain. 
Therefore, as long as the indigenous plaintiff incurs some loss, quantifiable or otherwise, the 
expense element can be satisfied.” in Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust 
Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 645.  
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The Swedish civil law approach to the unjust enrichment concept is that there 
is no separate condition of ‘at the expense of the claimant’. The first element 
of ‘enrichment’ can be perceived in common law as including a transfer of 
value from the claimant which can be transferred through means of risk-
outsourcing in where the system of outsourcing pushes the risks to the bottom 
of the supply chain, onto workers and small suppliers, that cannot or are not 
capable of bearing such risks. However, there is no issue of ‘correspondence’ 
in civil law – an enrichment is at the expense of the claimant even if he or she 
has not suffered any loss. Instead, the burden of proof falls on the defendant 
to prove that he or she has a legal reason for keeping the enrichment.185  
 
Even though unjust enrichment is underpinned by corrective justice which 
insinuate a requirement of an equivalence between a loss and a gain, the 
umbrella of corrective justice is sufficiently wide to include an approach of 
‘no correspondence’.186  
 
If we apply the element of ‘at the expense of the claimant’ onto the case 
against Boliden, the value for Boliden is the saved expense in service due that 
they outsourced the processing of their toxic waste to a Chilean company. 
The value was transferred from the claimants because they suffered the 
undesired consequences of environmental damages and health issues due to 
the toxic waste that was left unprocessed in Arica. The people living in Arica 
are also missing out on a potential gain because they cannot work, make use 
of the lands, or live in the area due to the environmental damages in and 
around the Chilean village.187  
 
The litigation processes after the collapse of Rana Plaza revealed that the 
parent companies did gain value by outsourcing their production. The 
suppliers and contractors could keep the production costs down by hiring 
                                               
185 See Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden, pp. 170–172. 
186 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 68–69. 
187 About earning profit from another’s property by ’interceptive subtraction’, see Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment, p. 85. 
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cheap labour in unsafe working conditions. All this at the expense of the 
claimants (and their families) who suffered the risks of unsafe working 
conditions and subsequently the physical damages and loss of friends and 
relatives when the risks materialised.188  
 
In summary, it is possible to prove that a parent company has been enriched 
at the expense of the rights-holders, even if there is no equivalence between 
the loss of the claimant and the gain of the parent company. 
4.3.2 Third parties  
There is one question left to be examined – was the parent company enriched 
at the expense of the claimant when the benefit was conferred by a third party?  
In common law, scholars point of view differs. Edelman’s approach implies 
that there has to be a direct link between the loss of the claimant and the gain 
of the defendant, while others argue that under some circumstances it is 
possible for the court to consider exceptions to this general rule of 
‘directness’.189  
 
The general rule of a directness between the gain of the defendant and the loss 
of the claimant would exclude a right to restitution when there is a third party 
involved in the transfer of benefit. In the context of MNEs and victims of 
human rights abuses, the rights-holders would not be able to seek restitution 
from the parent company because the benefit was conferred to the parent from 
a supplier/subsidiary/contractor. Even if there is an unjust factor (for example 
duress or mistake) operating between the right-holder and the supplier, the 
right-holder would not receive a restitution from the parent company because 
there is no direct link between them.190  
                                               
188 Edelman, The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment, p. 212–216. 
189 See Edelman, The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment, pp. 212 and 213–216; Birks, An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 135–140; Birks, Unjust Enrichment, p. 77; and 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 75–85. 
190 The most typical example is when C confers a benefit on X who, as a consequence, 
transfers a benefit to D, and there is an unjust factor operating between C and X, thus D is 
the final receiver of the benefit. Or when X mistakenly pays D when he intended to pay C 
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In the context of transnational litigations, it would not be just for the parent 
or buying company to remedy both the third party who conferred the benefit 
to the parent, and also the claimant from which the benefit came from 
initially.191 But fortunately, there is no rule without an exception. The element 
of ‘at the expense of’ can be satisfied although the defendant (parent company 
or buying company) is not responsible for the loss of the claimant.192   
 
‘Title and tracing’ is probably the most common situation that would lead the 
court to disregard the general rule of directness. If a subsidiary within an 
MNE has received a benefit from a right-holder in an improper way (for 
example by stealing an object, made use of lands the subsidiary is not entitled 
to, or hired children for labour), and then conferred the benefit to the parent 
company, the right-holder is entitled to restitution from the parent company. 
Even if the parent company has received the benefit without doing anything 
wrong directly to the right-holder, they have benefited from the right-holder 
through a subsidiary who was not entitled to the benefit in the first place.193   
 
This situation could be applied in the context of Boliden Minerals and the 
people living in Arica. Even if the claimants do not need to prove any 
wrongful conduct to successfully claim that the parent company have been 
                                               
because X owned money or intended to confer a gift to C, see Burrows, The Law of 
Restitution, pp. 70 and 71–74.  
191 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 70; and the argument that the sum of losses and 
gains must be zero, Birk’s subtraction is a ’zero-sum game’, Lionel D. Smith, ‘Three-Party 
Restitution: A Critique of Birk’s Theory of Interceptive Subtraction’, 11 Oxford J. Legal 
Stud. (1991), pp. 481 and 483, available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h= 
hein.journals/oxfjls11&i=497. [Accessed 2018-04-10].  
192 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 644; Burrows have identified four 
exceptions; title and tracing, agency, some subrogation rights and interceptive subtraction, 
see Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 75–85. 
193 The typical example is when something has been stolen from C by X, and X has conferred 
the stolen item to D. As long as C can prove his or her title and trace the specific benefit to 
D, C can successfully claim that C is entitled to restitution from D, See Burrows, The Law of 
Restitution, pp. 75–76. 
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enriched at their expense, the negligent processing and retaining of Bolidens 
waste by Promel in Arica would support their argument.194 
 
The identified benefit conferred to Boliden is the saved expense by 
outsourcing the processing of their toxic waste. This has been conferred to 
Boliden through Promel, who is the contractor. This benefit is at the expense 
of the people in Arica because Promel was negligent in their processing and 
retaining of the toxic waste which led to damages on the environment and 
health issues for the people living in Arica. This approach would be possible 
to apply onto other cases as well.195  
 
 ‘At the expense of the claimant’ is not an element that would have to be 
proved in civil law claims. Instead the parent company would have to prove 
a legal reason for keeping the benefit.196 It is therefore possible that the court 
would affirm that a parent company has been enriched at the expense of a 
right-holder in both common and civil law jurisdictions.  
4.4 Is the enrichment unjust?  
The third element of the doctrine of unjust enrichment is to evaluate whether 
the enrichment at the expense of the claimant have been unjust. The court has 
two options when choosing the right approach to the ‘unjust’ element. In 
common law, the approach is that the claimant must establish that the 
defendant has been enriched at the claimant’s expense due to an unjust 
factor.197 Another approach, most common in civil law, is that an enrichment 
                                               
194 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, pp. 645–646.  
195 For example, Fagan applied this view onto the case of the indigenous claims in Choc v 
Hudbay Minerals, see Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment 
Claims of Indigenous Peoples against Multinational Corporations, pp. 644–646.  
196 See Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden, pp. 170–172: and 
‘If these assets have been appropriated wrongfully, the current holder must proffer a valid 
explanation for retaining title’, see Oh, Viel-Piercing Unbound, pp. 80–138.  
197 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 86–87; and Birks, An Introduction to the Law of 
Restitution, chs 6–7 and 9. 
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should be restored if the defendant has been benefited on absence of basis.198 
The disregarding of unjust factors have also been discussed by common law 
scholars but has not been the preferred approach within common law 
jurisdictions.199  
 
If the court would prefer the ‘absence of basis’ approach, the effect would be, 
that when the claimant has proved an enrichment at his or her expense, the 
defendant must prove that he or she has a legal reason for keeping the 
enrichment.200  
 
In common law, the court would possibly apply the ‘unjust factor’ approach 
to the ‘unjust’ element, and the claimant would have to prove to the court that 
he or she has the right to restitution due to a factor that is considered unjust. 
Birks and Burrows have thoroughly analysed the most common unjust factors 
in English case law, but the list of possible unjust factors is not exhaustive.201 
The unjustness of the defendant’s enrichment often comes from a reason or a 
circumstance which makes the retention of an enrichment unjust. A reason 
could be a dishonest act or intent, and a circumstance could be the duress of 
the claimant.202  
 
In a claim made by a person who have been harmed in the operations of an 
MNE, the claimant could argue that the enrichment of the parent company is 
unjust because the benefit was due under duress. It is possible that the supplier 
                                               
198 See Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden, pp. 174–186. 
199 Except Sweden, Germany and France also prefer the ’absence of basis’ approach, see 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 95–96; and Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt utanför 
kontraktsförhållanden, pp. 26, 75 and 175. 
200 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 97–98 and Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City 
Council [1999] 2 AC 349, at 408–409.   
201 Example of unjust factors are: duress, mistake, failure of consideration and no consent. 
See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 86–87 and chs 10–20; and an analyse of unjust 
factors in Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, chs 6–7 and 9. 
202 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, pp. 646–647; Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 
pp. 86–87 and chs 10–20; and Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, chs 6–7 and 
9. 
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threatened or pressured workers to continue working under bad conditions, 
otherwise the employing supplier would terminate their employment contract. 
Such an economical duress is a factor that would be considered unjust and 
thereby leaving the claimant with a right to restitution.203 In the litigations 
after the Rana Plaza collapse, it was clear that the workers did not want to go 
back to work when they discovered that cracks appeared in the factory. When 
they refused to go back to work, they were threatened with termination.204 
 
To make the claim even stronger, the claimants could point to the commission 
of a wrong, such as a tort committed by the parent company. The claimants 
would not be required to prove that the parent company had committed an 
actionable wrong, just that the wrongfulness supports the unjust retention of 
the benefit.205 A claim in restitution on the ground of unjust enrichment 
against Boliden could arguably be supported by their negligence in due 
diligence investigations.206 
 
In a civil litigation process, the court would look at the ‘absence of basis’ of 
the parent company’s enrichment. If the parent company cannot provide for 
a legal reason, the assumption is that the enrichment at the expense of the 
claimant is unjust and the enrichment shall therefore be restored to the 
claimant.207  
 
Whatever approach the court may take in determining whether the enrichment 
of a parent or buying company has been unjust, it is possible that the court 
                                               
203 ’Economic duress’ could also consist in threats to induce another to break a contract. For 
example, another party in the supplier/sub-supplier network or the employer of the worker, 
see Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 257, 263–282. 
204 See victims statements in Das v George Weston Limited, at paras 89–92; and the 
procedural context in Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp., Inc., at para 1.  
205 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, pp. 648–649; and Kit Barker, ‘Unjust 
Enrichment: Containing the Beast’, 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud (1995), p. 470, available at:  
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/oxfjls15&i=471. [Accessed 2018-04-25].   
206 Arica v Boliden, p. 134 and 137.  
207 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 96; and Hellner, Om obehörig vinst särskilt 
utanför kontraktsförhållanden, p. 174. 
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may come to the conclusion that the parent company has been unjustly 
enriched because of human rights abuses in the operations of the MNE.  
4.5 Are there any defences to the parent 
company’s enrichment?  
When the court has affirmed that the enrichment at the expense of the 
claimant was unjust, the last step is to examine the parent company’s possible 
defences. A defence could be a fully or partial denial of an unjust enrichment 
or an acceptance of the cause of action thus defending that the liability should 
be reduced or eliminated.208 There is no consensus in the distinction of denial 
or defences to unjust enrichment, and some scholars have argued that the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment does not recognise any distinction between 
these two.209 
 
The view of different scholars may depend on how one is perceiving the term 
‘unjust’ – do the claimant have to establish an unjust factor or does the 
defendant have to prove that he or she had a legal reason for keeping the 
enrichment at the expense of the claimant.210 This thesis will not be concerned 
with the distinction between ‘denial’ or ‘defences’, but it is of importance to 
mention that the following examination of arguments can be viewed as either 
a ‘denial’ or a ‘defence’ depending on how one approach the ‘unjustness’ of 
the enrichment. 
 
A defence to a claim of unjust enrichment can be aimed at first three elements 
of the doctrine. The defendant could argue that he or she have not been 
enriched, or that the enrichment was not at the expense of the claimant, or 
                                               
208 See Helen Schott, ‘Defence, Denial or Cause of Action? ‘Enrichment Owed’ and the 
Absence of Legal Grond’ in Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp & Frederick Wilmot-Smith 
(eds.), Defences in Unjust Enrichment, Hart Publishing, Oxford, (2016), pp. 2–3 and 53–54. 
209 See Dyson et al., Defences in Unjust Enrichment, pp. 4–5.  
210 See section 5.4. above regarding ‘unjust factors’ or ‘absence of legal basis’ and Dyson et 
al., Defences in Unjust Enrichment, pp. 5–7.  
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that the enrichment was just.211 In the following sections defences will be 
examined in relation to the three main elements of the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment and in the context of a parent company’s unjust enrichment.  
4.5.1 No enrichment  
Defences to a claim of an ‘enrichment’ can be that the parent company accepts 
the cause of action (an unjust enrichment at the expense of the claimant) but 
argue that a restitution would be unacceptable.212  
 
A defence in change of position is available for a defendant whose position 
has so changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require 
him to make restitution, or alternatively to make restitution in full.213 The 
typical decision is when a defendant was initially enriched at the claimant’s 
expense but lost the enrichment (was disenriched).214 A parent company such 
as Loblaw or J.C. Penny Corporation could argue that they were initially 
enriched, but due that they did not receive the product from the claimant 
because the factory collapsed, they lost the benefit because they could not 
deliver products to the consumers.215 A contradicting aspect is that buying 
companies or parent companies could possibly already have accrued benefits 
from long term relationships with suppliers with unsafe working conditions, 
which would render this defence weak.216 A claim in unjust enrichment is 
                                               
211 Burrows have identified ten defences. For a detailed examination of each defense, see 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, chs 21–22.  
212 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 524–568.  
213 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 580; Storthoaks Riral Municipality v 
Mobil Oil Canada Ltd (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 1 (Canada); and Bank of New South Wales v 
Murphett [1983] 1 VR 489 (Australia). 
214 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 526; Birks, An Introduction to the Law of 
Restitution, pp. 410–415; and Dennis Klimchuk, ’What kind of Defence is Change of 
Position?’ in Dyson et al., Defences in Unjust Enrichment, p. 71.  
215 In the case of Das v George Weston Limited and Rahaman v J.C. Penny Corp., Inc, the 
parent companies bought their products from the suppliers operating in the garment factory 
of Rana Plaza.  
216 In the German case Muhammad Jabir and Others v KiK Textilien und Non-Food GmbH, 
the retailer KiK had a long-term relationship with a supplier whose factory in Pakistan caught 
fire due to lack of fire and workplace safety precautions which killed more than 250 persons. 
KiK admitted that it purchased 75% of the factory’s output and that the factory’s growth was 
mainly due to this commercial relationship, see Wesche and Saage-Maaß, Holding 
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underpinned with corrective justice which not only goes for the claimant but 
also for the defendant, but if he or she is no worse without the enrichment, 
the claim for restitution should be accepted.217  
 
Another way to defend oneself is to argue that it is difficult to establish an 
enrichment to the parent company. It may be difficult to identify any accretion 
of wealth to the parent company, or to prove that a benefit has been conferred 
from another entity within the MNE to the parent company.218  
4.5.2 Not at the claimant’s expense  
A possible defence to the element of ‘at the expense of the claimant’ is the 
defence of ‘passing on’. If accepted under the law of restitution, this defence 
requires the gain to the defendant to have been subtracted from the claimant. 
If the claimant has passed on the loss, the element of ‘at the expense of’ is 
nullified and it would be unjust to reverse the benefit to the claimant.219   
 
To have any success in this defence, the defendant must prove that the 
claimant, by passing on its loss, have avoided its own loss. This argument 
may seem strong because there is no ‘corrective justice’ in a restitution from 
the defendant to the claimant if the claimant has avoided its own loss. In that 
case, the claimant would be unjustly enriched.220   
 
However, there are two strong arguments against this defence. First and 
foremost, the claimant does not need to suffer any loss at all to prove that the 
defendant has been enriched at the expense of the claimant.221 It is only 
sufficient to prove that there has been a transfer of value from the claimant to 
                                               
Companies Liable for Human Rights Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers 
before German Civil Courts: Lessons from Jabir and Others v KiK, pp. 370–371.  
217 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 526.  
218 See section 4.2. above regarding the objective and subjective test of an enrichment to the 
defendant and section 4.3.2. about ’title and tracing’ an enrichment.  
219 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 614–615. 
220 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 614–615. 
221 Regarding ’at the expense of’ and ‘correspondence’ of loss in section 4.3.1. above.   
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the defendant. Also, if the loss has passed on from the claimant to another 
party, this does not deny the initial loss of the claimant. It is simplistic to 
argue that denying a restitution because the loss has passed on would be more 
just. The claimant could itself be liable to a claim in restitution due to the 
direct link between the claimant and the person the loss has passed on to. In 
such case, it is more in line with corrective justice to allow the claimant a 
restitution from the defendant which then can be passed on to the third person 
who suffered the final loss.222  
 
This defence is probably not a strong defence for a parent company who is 
trying to shield themselves from reversing a benefit to the claimant. A right-
holder would argue that the consequences they suffered due to human rights 
abuses cannot be avoided by passing their loss on to someone else. In the 
litigations after the Bhopal disaster, collapse of Rana Plaza and against 
Boliden Minerals – it is clear that the claimants have suffered physical and 
environmental damages. This type of damages is individual and cannot be 
passed on to another.  
4.5.3 A just enrichment  
The most preferable defence against a claim of unjust enrichment is perhaps 
that the enrichment is not truly unjust.223 Several defences have been 
identified and a few of them will be examined in this section, namely: counter 
restitution, bona fide purchase, dispute resolved and limitation.224  
 
                                               
222 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 614–615.  
223 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, p. 650.  
224 Apart from the defences mentioned, incapacity and illegality is also a defence against 
unjustness, see Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 569–570, 573, 575–580, 581–583, 589, 
601–602 and 604–605; Sonja Meier, ’Bona Fide Purchase as a Defence in Unjust 
Enrichment’ in Dyson et al., Defences in Unjust Enrichment, pp. 255–257; and 575–580; and 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (counter restitution); R Leslie Ltd v Sheill [1914] 3 KB 607 
and Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 
669 (incapacity).  
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A defence in ‘counter restitution’ is a defence that recognises a counter-claim 
of the defendant. The defendant has not been unjustly enriched if the claimant 
also benefited from the transfer or benefits.225 A parent company such as 
Loblaw or J.C. Penny Corporation could argue that they bought products from 
a supplier who hired the claimant and that the investment in buying products 
from suppliers overseas have positive implications on the host state’s 
economy, which affects the claimant in a positive way. It is therefore not more 
than just that the MNE should have benefited from the investment.226   
 
Whether this argument is effective as a defence against an unjust claim can 
be discussed. Bangladesh as a nation did probably profit from investments by 
MNEs such as Loblaw and J.C. Penny Corporation and therefore some of the 
consequences of the investments are not unjust. But the picture is not fully 
drawn, because the people working in the factory and their families did 
probably not gain or benefit directly from the companies’ investments in 
Bangladesh suppliers, instead they suffered the negative consequences of the 
investments. Therefore, the companies defence in a counter-claim would 
probably not deprive unjustness of their benefits.227 Such a defence could 
though reduce the final gain-based recovery which is to be restored to the 
claimant.228  
 
Another possible defence a parent company could use is ‘bona fide purchase’. 
This is an absolute defence, which not only protects the defendant but also 
                                               
225 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 569–570. 
226 An MNE would probably go even further and defend themselves with corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) actions, such as investing in welfare and providing for healthcare etc. 
This does not undertake the unjustness of being enriched at the expense of the claimants 
because the individual necessary benefit from the CSR-actions. See Fagan, Achieving 
Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples against 
Multinational Corporations, pp. 650–653. 
227 See Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples against Multinational Corporations, pp. 650–651. 
228 A defense can be a full or partial denial and the final compensation that is returned back 
to the claimant can be a smaller amount than the claimant initially asked for. If the enrichment 
has passed the subjective test, the actual gain to the parent company may be smaller than it 
is seen objectively, see the discussion in section 4.2. ’Has the parent company been 
enriched?’ above.  
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third parties who have received the benefit from the defendant. Not everyone 
agree that this defence is legitimate to an unjust enrichment claim, but it has 
been recognised by English courts.229 A defence in bona fide purchase 
protects the defendant’s reliance on his exchange transaction with a third 
party and not only from returning what the parent company received. 230 A 
parent company such as Boliden could have argued that they indeed benefited 
through the company Promel, but that they were in good faith when they 
signed the contract with the Chilean company and did not know that the 
enrichment flowing from the claimant was obtained in an improper way. It is 
possible that Loblaw, J.C. Penny Corporation and UCC could have used the 
same defence – they did not know about the conditions and the low wages 
within their supplier network and therefore their enrichment are not unjust.  
 
However, Boliden would probably not succeed in such defence, because their 
employees did discover that Promel would not be able to pursue the 
processing of the toxic waste properly. The defence would neither shield 
Loblaw, J.C. Penny Corporation nor UCC from giving back what they 
unjustly gained. The claimants could easily prove that the parent companies 
did know about the risk of adverse human rights impacts within the supplier 
network or subsidiary’s operations.231 Another aspect is that the companies 
had a choice in pursuing the operations while the claimants probably did not 
due to economic duress.232 
 
The two remaining defences are dispute resolved and limitation. These 
defences are not exclusive for the doctrine of unjust enrichment. They are 
                                               
229 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 573 and 575–580; and Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd. 
230 See Meier, Bona Fide Purchase as a Defence in Unjust Enrichment, pp. 255–257; 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 573 and 575–580; and Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. 
231 In the litigations against Loblaw, the claimants argued that the parent company knew about 
the insufficient working conditions and low wages, Das v George Weston Limited, para 126. 
232  In indigenous claims Fagan suggest that a defence in ’bona fide purchase’ is weak because 
”The MNC presumably has a choice in pursuing the given venture, while the indigenous 
peoples most likely will not have a choice, for example, in giving up their land.”, Fagan, 
Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous Peoples 
against Multinational Corporations, p. 654.  
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defences that will lead to a courts dismissal of the case on procedural grounds. 
The defence in dispute resolved refers to the concept of res judicata. The 
claimant’s case will be dismissed because the dispute has already been 
resolved. The defence in dispute resolved bars the ‘floodgates of litigations’ 
that may come with the various unjust factors that the claimant can consider 
in a claim of unjust enrichment.233  
 
If the parent company and the claimants have made an agreement outside 
court, this agreement would bar future litigations due to the same actions. In 
the litigation processes against UCC and UCIL after the Bhopal disaster, the 
parent company UCC and the state of India agreed on a settlement outside 
court. In this settlement the MNE decided to pay the Indian government an 
amount of money and in return the government promised to quash any future 
litigations against the MNE. Such settlement would bar future litigations.234  
 
Most claims have a period of limitation, after a certain period of time the 
defendant is free from legal actions taking place against him or her. The 
limitation period also works as an incentive for claimants to not sit on their 
claims but to pursue them as quickly as possible. Also, proving a cause of 
action may be more difficult the longer it takes for the claimant to pursue their 
legal actions. When the limitation period has passed a claim in unjust 
enrichment against the defendant will be barred.235  
 
The limitations periods differ depending on jurisdiction. In the cases against 
UCC, Loblaw, J.C. Penny Corporation and Boliden the limitation period was 
not a strong defence and not a defence the parent companies could rely on. 
Sometimes the litigation processes takes time because of ineffective courts in 
                                               
233 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 601–602. 
234 Even if the government and the MNE agreed that no future litigations would take place, 
an Indian court did find the subsidiary and its executives criminal liable for the disaster, see 
Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 248 in Deva, ’Bhopal: the saga 
continues 31 years on’ p. 23.   
235 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 604–605. 
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the host states and therefore the claims against the parent company in their 
home states will not be pursued until the first dispute has been solved.  
 
In the case against Boliden the company did argue that the time period since 
the actual damages took place had already started a long time ago and that the 
court should dismiss the case. But the court did not dismiss the case due to 
limitation.236  
 
For the purpose of preventing ‘floodgates of litigations’ to proceed, the 
concept of unjust enrichment does provide parent or buying companies with 
a few strong defences, especially a defence in ‘dispute resolved’ and 
‘limitation’ to the element of unjustness.  
                                               
236 Arica v Boliden, pp. 49–51.  
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5 Conclusions  
Under Chapter 2 I discussed the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines. Both 
instruments are soft law instruments and the UNGPs is the only instrument 
that has been accepted by the international community in business and human 
rights. The framework provides the states with various possibilities to protect, 
respect and provide right-holders with access to remedy. The policies within 
the UNGPs are in most parts correspondent to the OECD Guidelines and 
together they imply that both states and business recognises that they have 
responsibilities in respect of human rights.237 Even though the instruments are 
just policies they acknowledge different approaches to the business and 
human rights agenda. Therefore, it would be foolish not to take advantage of 
this multiplex policy frameworks and go beyond previous attempts such as 
piercing the corporate veil and attributing a direct liability to parent 
corporations. Just as Ruggie realised, there is not only one way but many ways 
in reducing legal barriers and provide victims of human rights abuses with 
access to remedy.238  
 
The states duty to protect human rights and provide access to remedy is an 
obligation under international human rights law. There are no limits in how 
states could carry out their obligations, but extraterritorial legislations 
covering business operations overseas may interfere with other states right to 
regulate business operations within its territory. In somewhat the avoidance 
of interfering with state sovereignty has conquered the debate and the issue 
of right-holders possibility to seek redress for human rights abuse remains. In 
states where MNEs operates through suppliers or contractors, the host state 
often fails to live up to its obligations under international human rights law 
due to corruption or lack of sufficient support to claimants in litigation 
processes. Just because the access to remedy renders weak in the host state, 
                                               
237 See discussion under Chapter 2 ’The Guiding Principles’.  
238 See discussion under Chapter 2.3 ’Access to Remedy’.  
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the home state of the MNE cannot avoid its own obligations of reducing legal 
barriers and redress human rights abuses.  
 
Academics and courts have realised that the law of restitution and the concept 
of unjust enrichment could fill a void that cannot be covered by tort, criminal 
or contract law. The ability to make a claim against a parent company on the 
ground of unjust enrichment would correct the injustice of enriching MNEs 
at the expense of right-holders. The effects the doctrine of unjust enrichment 
could have is dependent on the peculiarities of each jurisdiction and therefore 
the effects in practice need further studying. Especially in regards of civil law 
jurisdiction such as Sweden in where the concept is not as developed as in the 
United Kingdom and the US.  
 
However, by grasping the essentials of the concept of unjust enrichment, the 
concept would not require the states to regulate business operations 
extraterritorially. Home states of the parent company would be allowed to 
provide victims with an access to remedy in restitution of unjust enrichments 
of the parent company when enrichments have incurred at the expense of 
right-holders. The parent company would be held liable based on its own 
unjust enrichments, and not due to acts or omissions of a supplier or 
contractor overseas. By reducing the home states legal barrier with a right to 
a gain-based recovery, it is possible to avoid infringing the sovereignty of the 
host state. Also, the concept of unjust enrichment does not exclude suppliers, 
subsidiaries or contractors from remediation because the elements of the 
doctrine is applicable on whoever the unjustly enriched party is. Last but not 
least, restitution from MNEs on the ground of unjust enrichment would 
relieve the right-holders from the burden that comes with proving a claim of 
piercing the corporate veil or holding a parent company directly liable. Such 
burdens affect the effectiveness of access to remedy.239 
 
                                               
239 In several cases the litigation processes have been time-consuming. For example, Arica v 
Boliden and In Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in 
December 1984.  
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There is no obligation for a parent company to pursue due diligence under 
international human rights law, even though both the UNGPs and the OECD 
Guidelines promote human rights due diligence. The concept of unjust 
enrichment would encourage parent companies to pursue due diligence to 
prevent themselves from benefitting at the expense of right-holders by any 
unjust factor. Through due diligence processes, a parent company would be 
able to identify factors such as economical duress in the state where the parent 
company have invested in a subsidiary, supplier or contractor. Encouraging 
business to pursue due diligence would also have effects on the ‘moral-
hazard’ problem. Sufficient risk management could prevent businesses from 
continuing to outsource their risks to suppliers or contractors operating in 
countries with low manufacturing standards where rule of law is weak and 
corruption high.  
 
The states can take comfort in that the international community and business 
itself believe that business has a responsibility to respect human rights 
throughout their operations. However, it is up to the states to provide both 
business and right-holders with the right tools. When existing rules and 
mechanisms are not sufficient to protect, respect and remedy human rights, 
there is nothing holding the states back from developing new policies or 
revisiting old concepts. The purpose of reducing legal barriers is to supply the 
right-holders with access to remedy and correct the unjustness of the system 
in where MNEs can operate without impediments. The concept of unjust 
enrichment is perhaps just another ‘concept’ in the corporate accountability 
context, but enabling various accountability concepts is important to 
sufficiently meet the social and legal expectations society has on both states 
and business. Unjust enrichment as a ground for restitution could assist in 
strengthening legal frameworks for holding MNEs accountable and help 
victims of human rights abuses to obtain remediation from a parent company, 
or any company within the MNE.  
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